Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.
Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.
Billy and Hammer are brought together by a prison captain in an attempt to help them find the value of life on a wilderness adventure. But as their time comes to an end, Billy witnesses a murder.
This book argues that explaining judicial independence-considered the fundamental question of comparative law and politics-requires a perspective that spans the democracy/autocracy divide. Rather than seeking separate explanations in each regime context, in The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy, Brad Epperly argues that political competition is a salient factor in determining levels of de facto judicial independence across regime type, and in autocracies a factor of far greater import. This is because a full "insurance" account of independence requires looking not only at the likelihood those in power might lose elections but also the variable risks associated with such an outcome, risks that are far higher for autocrats. First demonstrating that courts can and do provide insurance to former leaders, he then shows via exhaustive cross-national analyses that competition's effects are far higher in autocratic regimes, providing the first evidence for the causal nature of the relationship. Epperly argues that these findings differ from existing case study research because in democratic regimes, a lack of political competition means incumbents target the de jure independence of courts. This argument is illustrated via in-depth case study of the Hungarian Constitutional Court after the country's 2010 "constitutional coup," and then tested globally. Blending formal theory, observational and instrumental variables models, and elite interviews of leading Hungarian legal scholars and judges, Epperly offers a new framework for understanding judicial independence that integrates explanations of both de jure and de facto independence in both democratic and autocratic regimes.
Billy and Hammer are brought together by a prison captain in an attempt to help them find the value of life on a wilderness adventure. But as their time comes to an end, Billy witnesses a murder.
This book explores the benefits of digital patient engagement, from the perspectives of physicians, providers, and others in the healthcare system, and discusses what is working well in this new, digitally-empowered collaborative environment. Chapters present the changing landscape of patient engagement, starting with the impact of new payment models and Meaningful Use requirements, and the effects of patient engagement on patient safety, quality and outcomes, effective communications, and self-service transactions. The book explores social media and mobile as tools, presents guidance on privacy and security challenges, and provides helpful advice on how providers can get started. Vignettes and 23 case studies showcase the impact of patient engagement from a wide variety of settings, from large providers to small practices, and traditional medical clinics to eTherapy practices.
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