In this Volume, the various measures taken by successive Administrations to fully utilize the new-found potential are examined critically. These include the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The readings in this case consist of my own published work on the topic over the course of the past decade. The articles in question set out to do two things, namely situate the relevant policy measure in the appropriate historical context, namely the presence of output gaps, and second, evaluate the efficacy or wisdom of the proposed policy measures. For example, contrary to popular belief, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was a response to growing excess-capacity-related stagnation in the form of unemployment. Evidence is presented which shows that the output gaps referred to above were clearly on the minds of Ranking Republicans at the Kansas City National Convention in June 1928.
Provides an alternative approach to modeling material processes in economics. Argues that material wealth (GDP) is an increasing function of two universal factor inputs, namely broadly-defined energy and broadly-defined organization. Uses the results to examine the productivity slowdown, the ICT revolution and the phenomenon of outsourcing. The latter is attributed to a desire on the part of firms/shareholders to capture a greater share of the relevant energy rents.
The decade of the 1920s is colloquially known as the Roaring Twenties, when modernity came to the U.S. and the World, ushering in a decade of unbounded growth and new-found optimism. GDP growth was particularly strong, as was employment and investment. However, as counterintuitive as it may sound or appear, the 1920s were also years of stagnation, stagnation that owed to the fact that the new, greater potential was not being fully exploited. In other words, while things were great, they still fell short of the potential that had been created, resulting in a form of "growth stagnation." That is, stagnation in the midst of what was exceptional growth. Bernard C. Beaudreau is Professor of Economics at Université Laval in Quebec, Canada.
This is the first book to examine the “nuts and bolts” of production processes. It proposes a truly consilient approach to modeling production processes – one that goes beyond the vague principles found in standard economics – and provides details that are consistent with the applied mechanics and engineering literature. Providing a credible analysis of some of the most pressing questions of our era, such as the productivity slowdown and the information paradox, and bridging the gap between engineering, applied physics, economics, and management science, this book is a fascinating read for anyone interested in industry, the modern economy, and how physical factors constrain productivity growth.
The Oxford Dictionary defines a prophet as..a person who advocates or speaks in a visionary way about a new cause or theory, a definition which describes to a tee, the set of early 20th century authors whose writings on power are presented here. In short, the early 20th century witnessed a power surge, the likes of which the world had never experienced. As power and/or energy is the basis of material civilization, it stands to reason that this surge would surely go on to revolutionize life in general.
Raises doubt about the validity of the impending "Third Industrial Revolution" based on information and communications technology. Shows using basic science that information, unlike energy, is not physically productive, raising serious doubts over the ability of ICT to raise the standard of living.
Examines the causes of the explosion of consumer credit (consumer creditization) in the U.S. economy. Attributes it to the fallout from factory automation and outsourcing on the ability of the economy to monetize output. Presents the theory of underincome and uses it to examine the rise of consumer credit in general and the various government initiatives aimed at restoring overall purchasing power. These include the Garn-St-Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 and the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984. Concludes by examining various alternative exchange technologies.
Economists and historians view the events of the 1920s, the stock market boom and crash, the Great Depression and the New Deal, as being largely independent. This work presents an integrated, empirically-consistent view of this important period arguing that all of these events can be traced back to a paradigm technology shock, namely the electrification of U.S. industry from 1910 to 1926. The author goes from electrification through the stock market boom to the tariffs of the late 20s to the stock market crash and depression followed by the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933.
This book is part of a new generation of work on the events of the 1920s and 1930s, one that provides a gestalt view of this period. As such, the many events that have until now been viewed as unrelated, are viewed as parts of a greater whole, namely the introduction of a new power drive technology in the form of electric unit drive and its effects. The Roaring Twenties, the spectacular growth of the 1920s, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, the Stock Market Boom and Crash, the decline in investment expenditure, the ensuing depression and the National Industrial Recovery Act are all shown to be related.
Provides a network approach to understanding trade and trade policy from Antiquity to the present. Argues that trade has occurred, is occurring, and will continue to occur within well-defined, stable networks (e.g. empires, multinational firms, free-trade areas). Is able to rationalize the many puzzles that currrently plague international economics. Results can be generalized to all trade activity, ranging from economic to social, to political.
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 remains one of the most enigmatic pieces of legislation in the 20th century. Held by some to have caused the Great Depression, and by others to have worsened it, the Act’s underlying motives continue to be the subject of vigorous debate. For example, Dartmouth College economic historian and trade expert Douglas Irwin pointed to a political ploy on the part of the Republican Party to avert electoral defeat in 1928 by the Mid-West farm lobby. This book presents an alternative view, based in large measure on recently published studies. It is argued that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act should be understood as the Republican Party’s attempt at closing a widening output gap in the US, resulting from the widespread adoption of a new power transmission technology in the form of electric unit drive (EUD). Electric unit drive, by providing the wherewithal to increase machine speed considerably, resulted in productivity gains in the 40-100 percent range. Existing plant and equipment was now vastly more productive as a result of greater machine speeds. The book consists of six papers, five of which were previously published.
First studied by Swiss economist Jean-Charles Léonard Sismonde de Sismondi in 1819, Making Markets and Making Money: Strategy and Monetary Exchange examines the strategic aspects of monetary exchange--specifically, of making markets. Economist Bernard C. Beaudreau, author of Mass Production, the Stock Market Crash, and The Great Depression: The Macroeconomics of Electrification, examines the strategic aspects of making markets using basic game theory. Drawing from the archaeological and historical records, Beaudreau documents the prevalence of coordination failures in trade in general, and monetary exchange in particular. He argues, convincingly, that the ability to execute trades (make markets) has been, is, and will continue to be a more important economic problem that scarcity itself.
As Paul Krugman pointed out in his 2013 New York Times Op-Ed piece entitled “The New Growth Fizzle,” idea-based growth theory has been a bust. In this volume, an alternative approach is presented, one that, unlike existing growth theory, is consistent with the laws that govern material processes in general, with the historical record from time immemorial, and with data. Specifically, it provides compelling rationalizations of the 1970s productivity slowdown, Robert Solow’s information paradox and the failure of policy in Western industrialized nations to restore growth rates. Drawing from classical mechanics and thermodynamics, it provides a consilient account of the material processes that were the very subject of political economy in the 19th century and economics in the 20th and 21st centuries.
Economists and historians have viewed the events of the 1920s, the stock market boom and crash, the Great Depression and the New Deal, as largely independent events. This work provides an integrated view of this important period arguing that all of these events were the result of the electrification of U.S. industry from 1910 to 1926. The author goes from electrification through the stock market boom to the tariffs of the late 20s to the stock market crash and depression followed by the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933. The conclusion is that the NIRA is an attempt to correct the imbalance between production and consumption caused by industrial electrification.
The First and Second Industrial Revolutions were about energy: steam power revolutionized 19th-century Great Britain and electric power revolutionized 20th-century America. Yet political economy, the science of wealth born of the First Industrial Revolution, is devoid of energy, focusing instead on machinery or capital. According to basic mechanics, tools per se are not productive, as they are not source of energy. This book uses basic mechanics and thermodynamics to reexamine the rise of political economy as the science of wealth in the 19th and 20th centuries. The study shows that the failure of generations of political economists to formally incorporate energy into their models of production and distribution has led to the unfortunate state in which economics currently finds itself. With the inclusion of energy, important insights result. For instance, the Solow Residual in both 19th-century Great Britain and 20th-century America disappears. Unlike previous critiques of political economy, this analysis is constructive in nature, using past shortcomings and oversights as a springboard to a more consistent model of economic activity, especially production. The book is the first of its kind to use basic physics and thermodynamics as a guide to the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, and more importantly, to show how political economists from Smith to Fisher have attempted to understand these two energy-based Industrial Revolutions.
This is the first book to examine the “nuts and bolts” of production processes. It proposes a truly consilient approach to modeling production processes – one that goes beyond the vague principles found in standard economics – and provides details that are consistent with the applied mechanics and engineering literature. Providing a credible analysis of some of the most pressing questions of our era, such as the productivity slowdown and the information paradox, and bridging the gap between engineering, applied physics, economics, and management science, this book is a fascinating read for anyone interested in industry, the modern economy, and how physical factors constrain productivity growth.
In this timely work, Bernard C. Beaudreau provides a new approach to world trade, one that combines the archaeological and historical record with recent developments in the theory of networks, the result of which is a convincing account of trading patterns, past, present, and undoubtedly, into the future. For the first time, trade theory is no longer at odds with the historical record. Likewise, for the first time, trade policy is no longer at odds with the historical record. In short, this book is the first work of its kind to attempt to integrate over 8,000 years of large-scale international trade.
In this timely work, Bernard C. Beaudreau provides a new approach to world trade, one that combines the archaeological and historical record with recent developments in the theory of networks, the result of which is a convincing account of trading patterns, past, present, and undoubtedly, into the future. For the first time, trade theory is no longer at odds with the historical record. Likewise, for the first time, trade policy is no longer at odds with the historical record. In short, this book is the first work of its kind to attempt to integrate over 8,000 years of large-scale international trade.
The decade of the 1920s is colloquially known as the Roaring Twenties, when modernity came to the U.S. and the World, ushering in a decade of unbounded growth and new-found optimism. GDP growth was particularly strong, as was employment and investment. However, as counterintuitive as it may sound or appear, the 1920s were also years of stagnation, stagnation that owed to the fact that the new, greater potential was not being fully exploited. In other words, while things were great, they still fell short of the potential that had been created, resulting in a form of "growth stagnation." That is, stagnation in the midst of what was exceptional growth. Bernard C. Beaudreau is Professor of Economics at Université Laval in Quebec, Canada.
First studied by Swiss economist Jean-Charles Léonard Sismonde de Sismondi in 1819, Making Markets and Making Money: Strategy and Monetary Exchange examines the strategic aspects of monetary exchange--specifically, of making markets. Economist Bernard C. Beaudreau, author of Mass Production, the Stock Market Crash, and The Great Depression: The Macroeconomics of Electrification, examines the strategic aspects of making markets using basic game theory. Drawing from the archaeological and historical records, Beaudreau documents the prevalence of coordination failures in trade in general, and monetary exchange in particular. He argues, convincingly, that the ability to execute trades (make markets) has been, is, and will continue to be a more important economic problem that scarcity itself.
Draws parallels between the Financial Meltdown of 2008 and the Stock Market Crash of 1929. Argues that both were ultimately the result of technological change with electrification being the root cause of the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and factory automation and outsourcing being the cause of the current financial meltdown/crash. Shows how in both cases, money income was insufficient to sustain full employment and how Republican Administrations set out to resolve the problem (Hoover with commercial policy in 1929, Reagan and Bush in the 1980's with disguised fiscal policy in the form of mortgage securitization). Provides estimates of the income and expenditure shortfall from 1984 to 2009 in the range of $5 to $7 Trillion, which is shown to correspond to the extent of the sub-prime mortgage debacle. Concludes by discussing the various policy options available to the Obama Administration.
Three-quarters of a century after its enactment, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act remains an enigma. Either U.S. policymakers were grossly mistaken or we have missed something. Could there have been a method to their apparent madness? Could the upward tariff revision have made sense, however little? This book, based on the author's earlier work on Mass Production and the Great Depression, offers an alternative interpretation of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, namely as a response on the part of U.S. policymakers to the problem of underincome, itself the result of the massive technology shock that was electrification and the ensuing extremely-high-throughput, continuous-flow production techniques pioneered at the Ford Motor Company at its Highland Park plant. Productive capacity increased faster than income and expenditure, opening the gap that Reed Smoot, Willis C. Hawley, and the Republican Party set out to close via a generalized upward tariff revision.
In this book, recent advances in the field of game theory, specifically in the area of coordination games (theory and policy) are used to reexamine one of the most far-reaching, yet overlooked pieces of legislation in U.S. economic history, namely the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. While dismissed by most as misconceived, misguided, and mistaken, not to mention unconstitutional and anti-American, recent findings in the field of macroeconomic coordination open the door to a new interpretation, one that is more in keeping with the original objectives of the Roosevelt administration.
The Oxford Dictionary defines a prophet as..a person who advocates or speaks in a visionary way about a new cause or theory, a definition which describes to a tee, the set of early 20th century authors whose writings on power are presented here. In short, the early 20th century witnessed a power surge, the likes of which the world had never experienced. As power and/or energy is the basis of material civilization, it stands to reason that this surge would surely go on to revolutionize life in general.
Money talks, goods and services don't. This fundamental distinction is what sets a monetary economy apart from a barter one. As a result, economic growth requires more than capital, labor and energy. Being able to signal one's willingness to purchase goods and services is also required, a sine qua non of an advanced industrial economy. Formally, the ability to generate wealth, it therefore follows, is no longer a sufficient condition for growth, but instead, one of two necessary conditions, the other being the ability to monetize (real or nominal) output-the ability to give a voice to what would otherwise be a mere potential ... This book examines another type of monetary failure, namely the failure on the part of advanced industrial economies to monetize output, a failure rooted in the very nature of the transaction technology (producers and merchants) as opposed to being "supply related" (e.g. central banks, supply of specie)."--Back cover.
Identifying the exclusion of energy as a major oversight in political economy, this study uses basic mechanics and thermodynamics to reexamine the rise of political economy as the science of wealth in the 19th and 20th centuries.
Consumer credit has literally exploded in mature and emerging markets, prompting a number of questions, namely why? Why have the G-6 countries become increasingly dependent on growing consumer indebtedness to sustain output, employment and growth? This book attempts to answer this and related questions. Specifically, it points to two technology shocks, namely factory automation and outsourcing as the leading cause.
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