The Ethics is a philosophical book written by Baruch Spinoza. It was written in Latin. Although it was published posthumously in 1677, it is his most famous work, and is considered his magnum opus. In The Ethics, Spinoza attempts to demonstrate a "fully cohesive philosophical system that strives to provide a coherent picture of reality and to comprehend the meaning of an ethical life. Following a logical step-by-step format, it defines in turn the nature of God, the mind, human bondage to the emotions, and the power of understanding -- moving from a consideration of the eternal, to speculate upon humanity's place in the natural order, freedom, and the path to attainable happiness.
Benedict de Spinoza's writings laid the groundwork for the 18th century Enlightenment and for modern Biblical criticism. By virtue of his magnum opus, the Ethics, Spinoza is considered one of Western philosophy's definitive ethicists. Men would never be superstitious, if they could govern all their circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favoured by fortune: but being frequently driven into straits where rules are useless, and being often kept fluctuating pitiably between hope and fear by the uncertainty of fortune's greedily coveted favours, they are consequently, for the most part, very prone to credulity. The human mind is readily swayed this way or that in times of doubt, especially when hope and fear are struggling for the mastery, though usually it is boastful, over-confident, and vain. After experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness. Spinoza was one of the great rationalists of 17th century philosophy. He helped lay the groundwork for the 18th century Enlightenment and modern biblical criticism. His correspondence helps shed light on his ethical opinions and positions. Required reading for those who wish a deeper understanding of the writings of Benedict de Spinoza.
In this attempt to apply Euclid's methods to philosophy, Spinoza develops a deductive system based on his conception of existence as a vast unity and on psychological insights of great depth.
Benedict de Spinoza was one of the great rationalists of 17th century philosophy, he helped lay the groundwork for the 18th century Enlightenment and modern biblical criticism. His correspondences help shed light on his ethical opinions and positions. Required reading for those who wish a deeper understanding of the writings of Benedict de Spinoza.
Also contains Ethics, Correspondence, all in excellent R. Elwes translation. Basic works on entry to philosophy, pantheism, exchange of ideas with great contemporaries.
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Founded in the mid-17th century, Rationalism was philosophy's first step into the modern era. This volume contains the essential statements of Rationalism's three greatest figures: Descartes, who began it; Spinoza, who epitomized it; and Leibniz, who gave it its last serious expression.
Selections usually need no justifications. Some justification, however, of the treatment accorded Spinoza's Ethicsmay be necessary in this place. The object in taking the Ethics as much as possible out of the geometrical form, was not to improve upon the author's text; it was to give the lay reader a text of Spinoza he would find pleasanter to read and easier to understand. To the practice of popularization, Spinoza, one may confidently feel, would not be averse. He himself gave a short popular statement of his philosophy in the Political Treatise. The lay reader of philosophy is chiefly, if not wholly, interested in grasping a philosophic point of view. He is not interested in highly meticulous details, and still less is he interested in checking up the author's statements to see if the author is consistent with himself. He takes such consistency, even if unwarrantedly, for granted. A continuous reading of the original Ethics, even on a single topic, is impossible. The subject-matter is coherent, but the propositions do not hang together. By omitting the formal statement of the propositions; by omitting many of the demonstrations and almost all cross-references; by grouping related sections of the Ethics (with selections from theLetters and the Improvement of the Understanding) under sectional headings, the text has been made more continuous. It is the only time, probably, dismembering a treatise actually made it more unified. In an Appendix, the sources of the selections from the Ethics are summarily indicated. It would be a meaningless burden on the text to make full acknowledgments in footnotes. For the same reason, there has been almost no attempt made to show, by means of the conventional devices, the re-arrangements and abridgements that have been made. Every care has been taken not to distort in any way the meaning of the text. And that is all that is important in a volume of this kind. Wherever possible Spinoza's own chapter headings have been retained; and some of the sectional headings have either been taken from, or have been based upon expressions in the text. It would have been more in keeping with contemporary form to use the title On Historical Method or The New History instead of Of the Interpretation of Scripture; a chapter on Race Superiority would sound more important than one on The Vocation of the Hebrews; but such modernizing changes were not made because the aim has been to give the reader a text as faithful to the original as the character of this volume would allow. The selections have been taken from Elwes' translation of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, A Political Treatise and the Improvement of the Understanding; and from White's translation of the Ethics. These translations are no longer in copyright and hence it was not necessary to secure permission from the publishers to use them. Nonetheless, grateful acknowledgment is their just due.
Benedictus de Spinoza's ground-breaking philosophy made him a controversial figure of 17th century Rationalism and a major influence in the Enlightenment that followed. Spinoza developed contentious ideas from an early age, resulting in his expulsion from Amsterdam's Jewish community when he was only twenty-three. Christian orthodoxy likewise repudiated his philosophy and the Catholic Church later issued a ban on all his writings. Undeterred and unrepentant, Spinoza the outcast went on to explore notions of God, man, the universe and reality, an intellectual journey that culminated in his magnum opus, Ethica, which he wrote between 1661 And 1675. This was a metaphysical analysis so radical that he was forced to have it published after his death. The intention behind the Ethics is to demonstrate that it is possible for man to attain a good life and experience "blessedness" or knowledge of God. Inspired by Cartesian rigour, Spinoza employs Euclid's step-by-step logic to prove his various propositions, signing off each proof with an assured "Q.E.D." flourish. The five-part work addresses the nature of God and concludes that He is intrinsic to the universe rather than outside of it - and is certainly not a personal god in the orthodox sense. The treatise then proceeds to dissect the human mind and to explore the notion of free will and of good and evil. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the origin and strength of various emotions and the way in which they enslave man. In the final part he reveals how we can free ourselves of these emotional manacles by fully understanding how they work and by distinguishing between those that are harmful and those that are useful. For Spinoza, reason is the sole means to this end. It is no easy task, he warns, and few will succeed - "But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.
This edition of A Theological-Political Treatise Part I by Benedict of Spinoza and translated by R. H. M. Elwes is given by Ashed Phoenix - Million Book Edition
After experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness. I say "I finally resolved," for at first sight it seemed unwise willingly to lose hold on what was sure for the sake of something then uncertain. I could see the benefits which are acquired through fame and riches, and that I should be obliged to abandon the quest of such objects, if I seriously devoted myself to the search for something different and new. I perceived that if true happiness chanced to be placed in the former I should necessarily miss it; while if, on the other hand, it were not so placed, and I gave them my whole attention, I should equally fail. - Taken from "On the Improvement of the Understanding: Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect" written by Benedict de Spinoza
Men would never be superstitious, if they could govern all their circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favoured by fortune: but being frequently driven into straits where rules are useless, and being often kept fluctuating pitiably between hope and fear by the uncertainty of fortune's greedily coveted favours, they are consequently, for the most part, very prone to credulity. The human mind is readily swayed this way or that in times of doubt, especially when hope and fear are struggling for the mastery, though usually it is boastful, over - confident, and vain. This as a general fact I suppose everyone knows, though few, I believe, know their own nature; no one can have lived in the world without observing that most people, when in prosperity, are so over-brimming with wisdom (however inexperienced they may be), that they take every offer of advice as a personal insult, whereas in adversity they know not where to turn, but beg and pray for counsel from every passer-by. No plan is then too futile, too absurd, or too fatuous for their adoption; the most frivolous causes will raise them to hope, or plunge them into despair - if anything happens during their fright which reminds them of some past good or ill, they think it portends a happy or unhappy issue, and therefore (though it may have proved abortive a hundred times before) style it a lucky or unlucky omen. Anything which excites their astonishment they believe to be a portent signifying the anger of the gods or of the Supreme Being, and, mistaking superstition for religion, account it impious not to avert the evil with prayer and sacrifice. Signs and wonders of this sort they conjure up perpetually, till one might think Nature as mad as themselves, they interpret her so fantastically. Thus it is brought prominently before us, that superstition's chief victims are those persons who greedily covet temporal advantages; they it is, who (especially when they are in danger, and cannot help themselves) are wont with Prayers and womanish tears to implore help from God: upbraiding Reason as blind, because she cannot show a sure path to the shadows they pursue, and rejecting human wisdom as vain; but believing the phantoms of imagination, dreams, and other childish absurdities, to be the very oracles of Heaven. As though God had turned away from the wise, and written His decrees, not in the mind of man but in the entrails of beasts, or left them to be proclaimed by the inspiration and instinct of fools, madmen, and birds. Such is the unreason to which terror can drive mankind!
The book is perhaps the most ambitious attempt to apply the method of Euclid in philosophy. Spinoza puts forward a small number of definitions and axioms from which he attempts to derive hundreds of propositions and corollaries, such as "When the Mind imagines its own lack of power, it is saddened by it", "A free man thinks of nothing less than of death", and "The human Mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the Body, but something of it remains which is eternal.
386 pages. Large Print Edition.Part I. 4Concerning God.Part II. 66On the Nature and Origin of the MindPart III. 144On the Origin and Nature of the EmotionsPart IV.243Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the EmotionsPart V. 340Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human FreedomExcerpt: PART I. CONCERNING GOD.DEFINITIONS.I. By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.V. By mode, I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite-that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.Explanation-I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.Explanation-Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.AXIOMS.I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself.III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow.IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence.PROPOSITIONS.PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.Proof.-This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.PROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.Proof.-Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.Proof.-If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). Q.E.D.
YOU would not oftener see a pleasanter parlor than the one where Anna was sitting. It was handsomely and tastefully furnished, with abundance of pictures and prints on the walls. There were pretty chintz curtains to the one large window, and the couches and chairs were covered with the same material. There was a bright blazing fire burning in the grate, and a pretty kitten sat purring on the rug before it. The gas was lighted, and a table at Anna's elbow was strewn with books and magazines. Yet Anna sat in her comfortable chair before the fire, looking very doleful indeed, and she had been sitting so for a whole hour. She had a book in her hand, but she was not reading: her eyes were apparently fixed on the kitten before the fire, and it was easy to see that a very little would make them overflow with tears. In fact, Anna felt very unhappy, and—in spite of her long frocks which she had worn for a full half year—very babyish indeed. Anna had been left at home to keep house for a week, while her father and mother and the two younger children went to visit her grandfather. Anna had expected a very dear friend to stay with her while her father and mother were gone. Lillie Adams was to have come by the evening train, and Anna had caused a dainty hot supper to be prepared for her; but instead of her friend, the postman brought a hurried letter from Lillie Adams, saying that her father had been suddenly called abroad on business and wished her to go with him: so she was going to Germany upon three days' notice, instead of coming to visit Anna. This was a grievous disappointment, no doubt, and it was no wonder that Anna felt it; but she was not going to work to meet it in the right way. She was making the worst instead of the best of the case. She would not eat a mouthful of the supper which had been prepared for her friend; she betook herself to none of her usual evening employments, but sat moodily before the fire, picturing to herself the merry group which would be assembled at her grandfather's fireside, and the delightful bustle in which Lillie Adams was engaged preparing to go abroad. And contrasting these things with her own lonely condition and the long tiresome week of solitude which was before her. There was great danger of the eyes overflowing, after all: when the opening of the door and the entrance of the cook made a moment's diversion. Caroline Davis was a colored woman who had lived with Mrs. Grey ever since her marriage, and was regarded as a friend and counsellor by all the family, from the oldest to the youngest, especially by the children. She was apt to "speak her mind," as she said, on all occasions, especially when she thought she saw any of the children going wrong, and she had come to speak her mind now to her favorite, Miss Anna.
A man must appear somewhat vain, who declares that he has been obliged to reject much useful information, for fear of increasing too much the size of his work: and yet manages to find room for a few pages of his own, by way of Preface: but lest the objects which the compiler of this little work has had in view should be mistaken, he finds it absolutely necessary to say a few words in explanation of them. This small collection of military memorandums was originally intended only for the compiler’s own pocket; to assist him in the execution of his duty: but it occurred to him, that many of his military friends stood in equal need of such an aid, and would willingly give a few shillings for what they would not be at the trouble of collecting. The compiler has seen young men, on their first entry into the regiment of artillery, give a guinea for manuscripts, which contained a very small part of the information offered in this little book. From a persuasion that a very principal part of its merit is derived from its portability, every endeavor has been used to press much into a little compass; and it is hoped, that this power has not been so far exerted, as to make the whole unintelligible: but, it must be understood, that the compiler does not propose to convey instruction to the untaught, but only to make a few memorandums of reference to facts; which those already versed in the military profession are supposed to have the knowledge to apply. The totally ignorant of these matters, he has, therefore, nothing to say to; they must consult more voluminous works. An alphabetical arrangement is merely adopted as the best calculated for this purpose; and as nothing like a military dictionary is intended, all terms are omitted, not within the compiler’s plan. All reference to plates has, likewise been avoided; as they not only very much increase the cost, but the bulk of a book. The principal difficulty which the compiler has had in making this little collection, has been to confine it within the limits of his original plan. The quantity of useful information which has pressed for admittance, has been with reluctance rejected. Such authors only have been quoted, as are generally esteemed the best; and every advantage has been taken of such information, as the compiler has been able to collect from experienced friends; but he has ventured to offer nothing whatever of his own. The French military authors have been principally consulted, on all subjects not immediately confined to our own system; and such notes as are given respecting their ordnance, may be of use in drawing a comparison with our own; and may serve as references to those in the habit of reading their military works. The compiler has not, in any instance, attempted to offer changes which he may have been led to imagine improvements; or to point out what he thinks deserve the title of defects in our own system; but he has given every information according to the present practice in our service. He cannot, however, help expressing a hope, that he will one day see his little book laid by as totally obsolete, and a better built upon a system less complicated, and more applicable to that particular nature of service which this country has in every war the greatest reason to expect.
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