A comprehensive examination of policy measures intended to help emerging markets contend with large and volatile capital flows. While always episodic in nature, capital flows to emerging market economies have been especially volatile since the global financial crisis. After peaking at $680 billion in 2007, flows to emerging markets turned negative at the onset of crisis in 2008, then rebounded only to recede again during the U.S. sovereign debt downgrade in 2011. Since then, flows have continued to swing wildly, leaving emerging market policy makers wondering whether they can put in place policies during the inflow phase that will soften the blow when flows subsequently recede. This book offers the first comprehensive treatment of policy measures intended to help emerging markets contend with large and volatile capital flows. The authors, all IMF experts, explain that, in the spirit of liberalization and deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s, many emerging market governments eliminated capital inflow controls along with outflow controls. By 2012, however, capital inflow controls were again acknowledged as legitimate policy tools. Focusing on the macroeconomic and financial-stability risks associated with capital flows, the authors combine theoretical and empirical analysis to consider the interaction between monetary, exchange rate, macroprudential, and capital control policies to mitigate these risks. They examine the effectiveness of various policy tools, discuss the practical considerations and multilateral implications of their use, and provide concrete policy advice for dealing with capital inflows.
A comprehensive examination of policy measures intended to help emerging markets contend with large and volatile capital flows. While always episodic in nature, capital flows to emerging market economies have been especially volatile since the global financial crisis. After peaking at $680 billion in 2007, flows to emerging markets turned negative at the onset of crisis in 2008, then rebounded only to recede again during the U.S. sovereign debt downgrade in 2011. Since then, flows have continued to swing wildly, leaving emerging market policy makers wondering whether they can put in place policies during the inflow phase that will soften the blow when flows subsequently recede. This book offers the first comprehensive treatment of policy measures intended to help emerging markets contend with large and volatile capital flows. The authors, all IMF experts, explain that, in the spirit of liberalization and deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s, many emerging market governments eliminated capital inflow controls along with outflow controls. By 2012, however, capital inflow controls were again acknowledged as legitimate policy tools. Focusing on the macroeconomic and financial-stability risks associated with capital flows, the authors combine theoretical and empirical analysis to consider the interaction between monetary, exchange rate, macroprudential, and capital control policies to mitigate these risks. They examine the effectiveness of various policy tools, discuss the practical considerations and multilateral implications of their use, and provide concrete policy advice for dealing with capital inflows.
This paper uses a disequilibrium framework to investigate a possible credit crunch in the East Asian crisis countries (Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand) during 1997-98. It defines a credit crunch as a situation in which interest rates do not equilibrate supply and demand for credit and the aggregate amount is supply constrained, i.e. there is quantity rationing. In all three countries, rising real interest rates and weakening economic activity lowered credit demand and (with the exception of Indonesia in late 1997) there is little evidence of quantity rationing at the aggregate level—although individual firms may have lost access to credit.
This paper revisits the bipolar prescription for exchange rate regime choice and asks two questions: are the poles of hard pegs and pure floats still safer than the middle? And where to draw the line between safe floats and risky intermediate regimes? Our findings, based on a sample of 50 EMEs over 1980-2011, show that macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities are significantly greater under less flexible intermediate regimes—including hard pegs—as compared to floats. While not especially susceptible to banking or currency crises, hard pegs are significantly more prone to growth collapses, suggesting that the security of the hard end of the prescription is largely illusory. Intermediate regimes as a class are the most susceptible to crises, but “managed floats”—a subclass within such regimes—behave much more like pure floats, with significantly lower risks and fewer crises. “Managed floating,” however, is a nebulous concept; a characterization of more crisis prone regimes suggests no simple dividing line between safe floats and risky intermediate regimes.
This paper examines why surges in capital flows to emerging market economies (EMEs) occur, and what determines the allocation of capital across countries during such surge episodes. We use two different methodologies to identify surges in EMEs over 1980-2009, differentiating between those mainly caused by changes in the country's external liabilities (reflecting the investment decisions of foreigners), and those caused by changes in its assets (reflecting the decisions of residents). Global factors-including US interest rates and risk aversion¡-are key to determining whether a surge will occur, but domestic factors such as the country's external financing needs (as implied by an intertemporal optimizing model of the current account) and structural characteristics also matter, which explains why not all EMEs experience surges. Conditional on a surge occurring, moreover, the magnitude of the capital inflow depends largely on domestic factors including the country's external financing needs, and the exchange rate regime. Finally, while similar factors explain asset- and liability-driven surges, the latter are more sensitive to global factors and contagion.
This paper investigates why controls on capital inflows have a bad name, and evoke such visceral opposition, by tracing how capital controls have been used and perceived, since the late nineteenth century. While advanced countries often employed capital controls to tame speculative inflows during the last century, we conjecture that several factors undermined their subsequent use as prudential tools. First, it appears that inflow controls became inextricably linked with outflow controls. The latter have typically been more pervasive, more stringent, and more linked to autocratic regimes, failed macroeconomic policies, and financial crisis—inflow controls are thus damned by this “guilt by association.” Second, capital account restrictions often tend to be associated with current account restrictions. As countries aspired to achieve greater trade integration, capital controls came to be viewed as incompatible with free trade. Third, as policy activism of the 1970s gave way to the free market ideology of the 1980s and 1990s, the use of capital controls, even on inflows and for prudential purposes, fell into disrepute.
Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.
Exchange rate analysis lies at the center of the IMF's surveillance mandate and policy advice, as well as in the design of IMF-supported programs, and IMF staff are called upon to analyze a wide variety of exchange rate issues in various member countries, both small and large, from the least economically developed to the most advanced, and from those whose currencies circulate only locally to those whose currencies are of global importance. Each year, IMF staff produce dozens of studies on exchange rate issues, some published by the IMF, others in various professional journals or books. This book aims to give a flavor of the topics the IMF staff typically examine under the broad rubric of exchange rate analysis, encompassing several topics: determination and impact of the real exchange rate, assessing competitiveness and the equilibrium real exchange rate in specific countries or country groups, and considerations in the choice of exchange rate regime.
What considerations should guide public debt policy going forward? Should debt be reduced to achieve normative anchors (such as 60 percent of GDP), should it be increased further to finance a big public investment push, or should the existing debt be serviced forever? We argue that, for countries with ample fiscal space (little risk of encountering a fiscal crisis), raising distortive taxes merely to bring the debt down is a treatment cure that is worse than the disease. High public debt of course is costly, but it is a sunk cost only made worse by efforts to pay down the debt through distortionary taxation. Living with the debt is the welfare-maximizing policy. In decisions vis-à-vis the big push for public investment, golden-rule considerations remain salient, with due account taken of the additional servicing costs (and associated distortive taxation) from the resulting buildup of public debt.
We develop an open economy New Keynesian Model with foreign exchange intervention in the presence of a financial accelerator mechanism. We obtain closed-form solutions for the optimal interest rate policy and FX intervention under discretionary policy, in the face of shocks to risk appetite in international capital markets. The solution shows that FX intervention can help reduce the volatility of the economy and mitigate the welfare losses associated with such shocks. We also show that, when the financial accelerator is strong, the risk of multiple equilibria (self-fulfilling currency and inflation movements) is high. We determine the conditions under which indeterminacy can occur and highlight how the use of FX intervention reinforces the central bank’s credibility and limits the risk of multiple equilibria.
This paper examines the various roles of IMF financing in crisis prevention. Emerging market economies that experienced financial crises in the past have been subject to enormous economic and social costs, highlighting the importance of crisis prevention. While the main defense against a crisis lies in a country’s own policies and institutional framework, the IMF can contribute to these efforts through its surveillance activities, provision of technical assistance, and promotion of standards and codes. But the IMF may be able to contribute to crisis prevention more directly by providing contingent financial support. This paper explores the theoretical basis of, and empirical evidence for, possible “crisis prevention programs.”
The relationship between current account developments and changes in the macroeconomic environment remains a key issue in open economy macroeconomics. This paper extends the standard intertemporal optimizing model of the current account to incorporate the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on private savings behavior. It is shown that the greater the uncertainty in national cash flow, defined as output less investment less government expenditure, the greater is the precautionary demand for savings and, other things equal, the larger is the current account surplus. Empirical support for the model is found using quarterly data from four large industrial countries.
This paper examines whether cross-border capital flows can be regulated by imposing capital account restrictions (CARs) in both source and recipient countries, as was originally advocated by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. To this end, we use data on bilateral cross-border bank flows from 31 source to 76 recipient (advanced and emerging market) countries over 1995–2012, and combine this information with a new and comprehensive dataset on various outflow and inflow related capital controls and prudential measures in these countries. Our findings suggest that CARs at either end can significantly influence the volume of cross-border bank flows, with restrictions at both ends associated with a larger reduction in flows. We also find evidence of cross-border spillovers whereby inflow restrictions imposed by countries are associated with larger flows to other countries. These findings suggest a useful scope for policy coordination between source and recipient countries, as well as among recipient countries, to better manage potentially disruptive flows.
Why have emerging market economies (EMEs) been stockpiling international reserves? We find that motives have varied over time?vulnerability to current account shocks was relatively important in the 1980s but, as EMEs have become more financially integrated, factors related to the magnitude of potential capital outflows have gained in importance. Reserve accumulation as a by-product of undervalued currencies has also become more important since the Asian crisis. Correspondingly, using quantile regressions, we find that the reason for holding reserves varies according to the country's position in the global reserves distribution. High reserve holders, who tend to be more financially integrated, are motivated by insurance against capital account rather than current account shocks, and are more sensitive to the cost of holding reserves than are low-reserve holders. Currency undervaluation is a significant determinant across the reserves distribution, albeit for different reasons.
This paper analyzes the use of unconventional policy instruments in New Keynesian setups in which the ‘divine coincidence’ breaks down. The paper discusses the role of a second instrument and its coordination with conventional interest rate policy, and presents theoretical results on equilibrium determinacy, the inflation bias, the stabilization bias, and the optimal central banker’s preferences when both instruments are available. We show that the use of an unconventional instrument can help reduce the zone of equilibrium indeterminacy and the volatility of the economy. However, in some circumstances, committing not to use the second instrument may be welfare improving (a result akin to Rogoff (1985a) example of counterproductive coordination). We further show that the optimal central banker should be both aggressive against inflation, and interventionist in using the unconventional policy instrument. As long as price setting depends on expectations about the future, there are gains from establishing credibility by using any instrument that affects these expectations.
This paper is a preliminary review of the design of and early experience with IMF-supported programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand during 1997-98. The review takes into account developments as of October 1998, and was the basis for a discussion of the programs by the IMF's Executive Board in December 1998.
Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.
Uncertainty about the export earnings accruing to a country (sometimes referred to as export instability) is an important source of macroeconomic uncertainty in many developing countries. Theory predicts that countries should react to increases in this form of uncertainty by increasing their level of savings. The resulting asset accumulations would then act as the country’s insurance against the greater riskiness in its income stream. The paper tests this implication for a large sample of developing countries. In general, the results suggest that developing countries have indeed responded to increases in export instability by building up precautionary savings balances.
Although few would doubt that very high inflation is bad for growth, there is much less agreement about moderate inflation’s effects. Using panel regressions and a nonlinear specification, this paper finds a statistically and economically significant negative relationship between inflation and growth. This relationship holds at all but the lowest inflation rates and is robust across various samples and specifications. The method of binary recursive trees identifies inflation as one the most important statistical determinants of growth. Finally, while there are short-run growth costs of disinflation, these are only relevant for the most severe disinflations, or when the initial inflation rate is well within the single-digit range.
In 2001- 02, Argentina experienced one of the worst economic crises in its history. A default on government debt, which occurred against the backdrop of a prolonged recession, sent the Argentine currency and economy into a tailspin. Although the economy has since recovered from the worst, the crisis has imposed hardships on the people of Argentina, and the road back to sustained growth and stability is long. The crisis was all the more troubling in light of the fact that Argentina was widely considered a model reformer and was engaged in a succession of IMF-supported programs through much of the 1990s. This Occasional Paper examines the origins of the crisis and its evolution up to early 2002 and draws general policy lessons, both for countries’ efforts to prevent crises and for the IMF’s surveillance and use of its financial resources.
This paper proposes a methodology for testing whether capital flows to developing countries are determined by economic fundamentals or by purely speculative forces. We use the intertemporal optimizing approach to current account determination as our benchmark for judging the behavior of capital flows. According to this approach, capital flows should act as a buffer to smooth consumption in the face of temporary shocks to national cash flow, defined as output less investment less government expenditures. The results are encouraging. For a large sample of developing countries, economic fundamentals are indeed found to be the most important determinant of capital flows.
Governments issue debt for good and bad reasons. While the good reasons—intertemporal tax-smoothing, fiscal stimulus, and asset management—can explain some of the increases in public debt in recent years, they cannot account for all of the observed changes. Bad reasons for borrowing are driven by political failures associated with intergenerational transfers, strategic manipulation, and common pool problems. These political failures are a major cause of overborrowing though budgetary institutions and fiscal rules can play a role in mitigating governments’ tendencies to overborrow. While it is difficult to establish a clear causal link from high public debt to low output growth, it is likely that some countries pay a price—in terms of lower growth and greater output volatility—for excessive debt accumulation.
Milton Friedman argued that flexible exchange rates would facilitate external adjustment. Recent studies find surprisingly little robust evidence that they do. We argue that this is because they use composite (or aggregate) exchange rate regime classifications, which often mask very heterogeneous bilateral relationships between countries. Constructing a novel dataset of bilateral exchange rate regimes that differentiates by the degree of exchange rate flexibility, as well as by direct and indirect exchange rate relationships, for 181 countries over 1980–2011, we find a significant and empirically robust relationship between exchange rate flexibility and the speed of external adjustment. Our results are supported by several “natural experiments” of exogenous changes in bilateral exchange rate regimes.
This paper examines whether—and how—emerging market economies (EMEs) respond to capital flows to mitigate their untoward consequences. Based on a sample of about 50 EMEs over 2005Q1–2013Q4, we find that EME policy makers respond proactively to capital inflows by using a combination of policy tools: central banks raise the policy interest rate to address economic overheating concerns; intervene in the foreign exchange market to resist currency appreciation pressures; tighten macroprudential measures to dampen credit growth; and deploy capital inflow controls in the face of competitiveness and financial-stability concerns. Contrary to conventional policy advice to EMEs, we find no evidence of counter-cyclical fiscal policy in the face of capital inflows. Overall, policies are more likely to respond, and used in combination, during inflow surges than in more normal times.
The workhorse open-economy macro model suggests that capital inflows are contractionary because they appreciate the currency and reduce net exports. Emerging market policy makers however believe that inflows lead to credit booms and rising output, and the evidence appears to go their way. To reconcile theory and reality, we extend the set of assets included in the Mundell-Fleming model to include both bonds and non-bonds. At a given policy rate, inflows may decrease the rate on non-bonds, reducing the cost of financial intermediation, potentially offsetting the contractionary impact of appreciation. We explore the implications theoretically and empirically, and find support for the key predictions in the data.
The member countries of the International Monetary Fund collaborate to try to assure orderly exchange arrangements and promote a stable system of exchange rates, recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary system is to facilitate the exchange of goods, services, and capital, and to sustain sound economic growth. The paper reviews the stability of the overall system of exchange rates by examining macroeconomic performance (inflation, growth, crises) under alternative exchange rate regimes; implications of exchange rate regime choice for interaction with the rest of the system (external adjustment, trade integration, capital flows); and potential sources of stress to the international monetary system.
An empirical study of exchange rate regimes based on data compiled from 150 member countries of the International Monetary Fund over the past thirty years. Few topics in international economics are as controversial as the choice of an exchange rate regime. Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, countries have adopted a wide variety of regimes, ranging from pure floats at one extreme to currency boards and dollarization at the other. While a vast theoretical literature explores the choice and consequences of exchange rate regimes, the abundance of possible effects makes it difficult to establish clear relationships between regimes and common macroeconomic policy targets such as inflation and growth. This book takes a systematic look at the evidence on macroeconomic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes, drawing on the experience of some 150 member countries of the International Monetary Fund over the past thirty years. Among other questions, it asks whether pegging the exchange rate leads to lower inflation, whether floating exchange rates are associated with faster output growth, and whether pegged regimes are particularly prone to currency and other crises. The book draws on history and theory to delineate the debate and on standard statistical methods to assess the empirical evidence, and includes a CD-ROM containing the data set used.
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