An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various philosophical issues. In Cognition and Perception, Athanassios Raftopoulos discusses the cognitive penetrability of perception and claims that there is a part of visual processes (which he calls “perception”) that results in representational states with nonconceptual content; that is, a part that retrieves information from visual scenes in conceptually unmediated, “bottom-up,” theory-neutral ways. Raftopoulos applies this insight to problems in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, and examines how we access the external world through our perception as well as what we can know of that world. To show that there is a theory-neutral part of existence, Raftopoulos turns to cognitive science and argues that there is substantial scientific evidence. He then claims that perception induces representational states with nonconceptual content and examines the nature of the nonconceptual content. The nonconceptual information retrieved, he argues, does not allow the identification or recognition of an object but only its individuation as a discrete persistent object with certain spatiotemporal properties and other features. Object individuation, however, suffices to determine the referents of perceptual demonstratives. Raftopoulos defends his account in the context of current discussions on the issue of the theory-ladenness of perception (namely the Fodor-Churchland debate), and then discusses the repercussions of his thesis for problems in the philosophy of science. Finally, Raftopoulos claims that there is a minimal form of realism that is defensible. This minimal realism holds that objects, their spatiotemporal properties, and such features as shape, orientation, and motion are real, mind-independent properties in the world.
This book is about the interweaving between cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of the two stages of perception, namely early and late vision, in justifying perceptual beliefs. It examines the impact of the epistemic role of perception in defining cognitive penetrability and the relation between the epistemic role of perceptual stages and the kinds (direct or indirect) of cognitive effects on perceptual processing. The book presents the argument that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because neither is it affected directly by cognition, nor does cognition affect its epistemic role. It also argues that late vision, even though it is cognitively penetrated and, thus, affected by concepts, is still a perceptual state that does not involve any discursive inferences and does not belong to the space of reasons. Finally, an account is given as to how cognitive states with symbolic content could affect perceptual states with iconic, analog content, during late vision.
The issue of the cognitive impenetrability or penetrability of perception lay dormant for a long period of time. Though philosophers reacted to the relativism implied by the work of Hanson, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, they concentrated their efforts in dealing with the danger of the incommensurability of theories. They tried to show by philosophical and detailed historical analysis that scientists within different paradigms do communicate with each other and put their respective theories to the empirical test. Curiously enough the same philosophers did not seek to examine the very foundation of the relativistic trend, namely the thesis that perception is cognitively penetrable and theory-laden. In the last decade there has been a keen interest in studying the cognition/perception boundary. However, the discussion focused mainly on the grounding of conceptual content on perception and on the embodiment of cognition. The repercussions of these issues for the problem of the cognitive effects on perception were largely ignored. The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception. The volume consists of eleven chapters, each one addressing the issue from a different perspective. Eight of the chapters were written by philosophers and cognitive scientists, and three by psychologists and neuropsychologists. These differences notwithstanding, the chapters share many common themes. The role of attention in perception, the contribution of action to perception, the relation between perception and scientific data, the examination of the content of perception and its nature and the detailed examination of the ways background knowledge affects perception, are among these themes. Most chapters combine philosophical analysis with psychological and/or neuropsychological evidence, which shows that there is consensus as to the kind of approaches that are currently deemed necessary for an adequate examination of the problem.
An Evzon is murdered by an unknown sniper at Syntagma Square during the changing of the guard ... Who is trying to derail the country? Who is trying to create chaos? A strange series of events unfolds as the National Intelligence Agency attempts to identify the perpetrators. What is the rivalry about that has been playing out in Athens for decades between certain Brotherhoods and Orders? Germany, Antarctica, Greece, Israel ... what is their involvement and what are they looking for? ... What's the secret? What heritage are the Greek Brothers presiding over and defending? The eternal fight of good with evil returns ... once more on the Greek battlefield ... A week in June 2009, a crucial week, where the "good" rises up to meet the "evil" in a battle of dominance... in Greece ... However, this time they are coordinated. This is a battle that is constantly being conducted on a political, economic and cultural level. Bloodstained Triangles ... many times you will pause reading, as faces and events will remind you "coincidentally" of something you have already seen or heard .. Is this Imagination or is it Reality? True facts or fiction? You are the judge, by reading Kosmas’ story, a Major General of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) who undertakes an extraordinary mission during this particularly important week. For every name, event, historical reference and place mentioned herein, we invite you to use modern search engines on the web. You will be surprised by what you discover about the past ... and more so about the present ... The "plan" is still out there, centuries now, waiting provocatively for the reader to discover... if he, or she, succeeds ... Nothing is perchance ... nothing is by conjuncture ... the apex of the triangle is not coincidental ... From Chaos to Order ... »
An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various philosophical issues. In Cognition and Perception, Athanassios Raftopoulos discusses the cognitive penetrability of perception and claims that there is a part of visual processes (which he calls “perception”) that results in representational states with nonconceptual content; that is, a part that retrieves information from visual scenes in conceptually unmediated, “bottom-up,” theory-neutral ways. Raftopoulos applies this insight to problems in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, and examines how we access the external world through our perception as well as what we can know of that world. To show that there is a theory-neutral part of existence, Raftopoulos turns to cognitive science and argues that there is substantial scientific evidence. He then claims that perception induces representational states with nonconceptual content and examines the nature of the nonconceptual content. The nonconceptual information retrieved, he argues, does not allow the identification or recognition of an object but only its individuation as a discrete persistent object with certain spatiotemporal properties and other features. Object individuation, however, suffices to determine the referents of perceptual demonstratives. Raftopoulos defends his account in the context of current discussions on the issue of the theory-ladenness of perception (namely the Fodor-Churchland debate), and then discusses the repercussions of his thesis for problems in the philosophy of science. Finally, Raftopoulos claims that there is a minimal form of realism that is defensible. This minimal realism holds that objects, their spatiotemporal properties, and such features as shape, orientation, and motion are real, mind-independent properties in the world.
The issue of the cognitive impenetrability or penetrability of perception lay dormant for a long period of time. Though philosophers reacted to the relativism implied by the work of Hanson, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, they concentrated their efforts in dealing with the danger of the incommensurability of theories. They tried to show by philosophical and detailed historical analysis that scientists within different paradigms do communicate with each other and put their respective theories to the empirical test. Curiously enough the same philosophers did not seek to examine the very foundation of the relativistic trend, namely the thesis that perception is cognitively penetrable and theory-laden. In the last decade there has been a keen interest in studying the cognition/perception boundary. However, the discussion focused mainly on the grounding of conceptual content on perception and on the embodiment of cognition. The repercussions of these issues for the problem of the cognitive effects on perception were largely ignored. The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception. The volume consists of eleven chapters, each one addressing the issue from a different perspective. Eight of the chapters were written by philosophers and cognitive scientists, and three by psychologists and neuropsychologists. These differences notwithstanding, the chapters share many common themes. The role of attention in perception, the contribution of action to perception, the relation between perception and scientific data, the examination of the content of perception and its nature and the detailed examination of the ways background knowledge affects perception, are among these themes. Most chapters combine philosophical analysis with psychological and/or neuropsychological evidence, which shows that there is consensus as to the kind of approaches that are currently deemed necessary for an adequate examination of the problem.
This book is about the interweaving between cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of the two stages of perception, namely early and late vision, in justifying perceptual beliefs. It examines the impact of the epistemic role of perception in defining cognitive penetrability and the relation between the epistemic role of perceptual stages and the kinds (direct or indirect) of cognitive effects on perceptual processing. The book presents the argument that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because neither is it affected directly by cognition, nor does cognition affect its epistemic role. It also argues that late vision, even though it is cognitively penetrated and, thus, affected by concepts, is still a perceptual state that does not involve any discursive inferences and does not belong to the space of reasons. Finally, an account is given as to how cognitive states with symbolic content could affect perceptual states with iconic, analog content, during late vision.
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