Goldberg uses the questions posed by self psychology as point of entry to a thoughtful consideration of issues with which every clinician wrestles: the scientific status analysis, the relationships among its competing theories, the role of empathy in analytic method, and the place of the "self" in the analyst's explanatory strategies. Clinical chapters show how the notion of the self can provide organizing insights into little-appreciated character structures.
In The Prisonhouse of Psychoanalysis, Arnold Goldberg trains a searching, critical eye on his own profession. His subject matter is the system of interlocking constraints - theoretical, institutional, educational - that imprisons psychoanalysis and the psychoanalyst. His agenda is to sketch the shape analysis might take in the absence of these constraints. What emerges from these twin endeavors is a penetrating critique of psychoanalysis from the inside - from the vantage point of a senior analyst who has labored for many years within the prisonhouse that he now criticizes. In proffering an alternative vision of psychoanalysis, Goldberg ventures into recent literature in epistemology, philosophy of science, cognitive psychology, and the neurosciences, so that one valuable byproduct of his work is a brilliant application of insights culled from these fields to the question of what analysis is, and what it may yet become. His examination of "psychoanalysis without foundations" challenges the ability of infancy research data and neurological findings, respectively, to provide an empirical rock bottom from which psychoanalytic theory-building can proceed. His chapter on "psychoanalysis without representations" reviews the analytic literature on the latter concept, only to show how recent theories of brain processing, including connectionism, provides a basis for understanding mental phenomena without any intermediary representations. Finally, his vision of "psychoanalysis without a subject" assesses recent findings about the nature of memory, insights of contemporary philosophy, and Kohut's notion of the selfobject as converging tributaries that make possible an analysis that dispenses with the conventional dichotomy of subject and object.
From the unfaithful husband to the binge eater, from the secret cross-dresser to the pilferer of worthless items, there are those who seem to live two lives, to be divided selves, to be literally of two minds. This division or "vertical split" appears in a person at odds with himself, a person who puzzles over, and even heartily dislikes, that parallel person who behaves in so repugnant a manner. In Being of Two Minds, Arnold Goldberg provides trenchant insight into such divided minds - their origins, their appearances, and their treatment. Goldberg's inquiry into divided minds leads to a return to the psychoanalytic concept of disavowal, which forms the basis of the vertical split. Goldberg explores the developmental circumstances that tend to a reliance on disavowal, provides numerous examples of the emergence of disavowal in the treatment situation, and considers the therapeutic approaches through which disavowal may be addressed. He is especially perceptive in discussing the manner in which the therapist's own tendency to disavow may collusively interact with that of the patient. Goldberg considers the full range of splits to which disavowal gives rise, from circumscribed instances of dissociation to the much-debated multiple personality disorders. He gives special attention to the role of the vertical split in patients with behavior disorders; here his thoughtful insights point to a treatment approach that significantly differs both from the simple ascription of a 'self disorder' and from the usual pedagogical emphasis on issues of self-control and/or punishment. As Goldberg shows, the repugnance felt by many therapists for offensive behaviors emanating from the patient's parallel self are frequently shared by the patient, who commonly despises misbehavior that he is unable to understand. Being of Two Minds begins to formulate just such understanding, to the great benefit of patient and therapist alike.
Psychotherapy and psychoanalysis don't always work. Inevitably, a therapy or analysis may fail to alleviate the suffering of the patient. The reasons why this occurs are as manifold as the patients and analysts themselves, and oftentimes are a source of frustration and vexation to clinicians, who aren't always eager to discuss them. Taking the challenge head-on, Arnold Goldberg proposes to demystify failure in an effort to determine its essential meaning before determining its causes. Utilizing multiple vignettes of failed cases, he offers a deconstruction and a subsequent taxonomy of failure, delineating cases that go bad after six months from cases that never get off the ground, mismatches from impasses, failures of empathy from failures of inattention. Commonalities in the experience of failure – conceived as less a misapplication of technique than consequences of a co-constructed yet fraught therapeutic relationship – begin to emerge for scrutiny.
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