The Army War College Review, a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, The AWC Review connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, Landpower, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms.
In examining the role of security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, the author draws broad lessons from which he provides concrete recommendations to improve the conduct of further missions. Rather than do away with such contractors altogether, the author recommends limiting their roles, providing better oversight of their activities, and improving legal accountability for their wrong doing. This monograph will be of interest to soldiers, military leadership, military contractors, especially those that provide logistical support activities in conflict zones, and policymakers engaged in the difficult task of planning and conducting contingency operations. Related products: Counterinsurgency resources collection is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/counterinsurgency The Surge, 2007-2008 can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00613-8?ctid=1158 Other products produced by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1609
Does history repeat itself? This monograph clearly answers 'no,' firmly. However, it does not argue that an absence of repetition in the sense of analogy means that history can have no utility for the soldier today. This monograph argues for a 'historical parallelism,' in place of shaky or false analogy. The past, even the distant and ancient past, provides evidence of the potency of lasting virtues of good conduct. This monograph concludes by offering four recommendations: 1. Behave prudently; 2. Remember the concept of the great stream of time; 3. Do not forget that war nearly always is a gamble; 4. War should only be waged with strategic sense"--Publisher's web site.
The following two articles were written during and immediately after the war in Kosovo. The first is an adaptation of an earlier work written after a trip to Asia in 1998. In that essay, I suggested that foreign militaries were beginning to perceive our fixation on a firepower-centered way of war as an exploitable weakness. In fact, some states, armed with experience gained against us in real war, had already begun to evolve a doctrine to counter our superiority in precision. These potential adversaries concluded that dispersion, deception, patience and a willingness to absorb punishment offered them the means to endure precision strike long enough to outlast a technologically superior foe. Subsequent practical experience in Kosovo caused me to modify this thesis somewhat, but not much. The "From Korea to Kosovo" article was written after a visit to Albania in May 1999. There I developed the central thesis for this essay: In wars of limited liability, success must be gained with a limited expenditure of means. A brief review of recent history tells us that we have been practically learning this lesson in real wars for half a century, beginning with Korea. The imperative to prepare for a full-scale war against the Soviets, however, has effectively impeded our ability to embed this lesson into our warfighting doctrine. Kosovo is a wake-up call. This article concludes with a maneuver warfare concept for this new era of limited liability wars in the Precision Age.
As the Army Reserve Components -- the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard -- assume an "operational" mission as the force drawdowns in overseas contingency operations occur, the Army senior military and civilian leadership should consider the ramifications and realities of such a mission in what is expected to be a relatively peaceful time. This monograph explores some of these considerations regarding the implementation of the Army Total Force Policy, identifies potential obstacles, and makes recommendations to better engage the "three Armies" in a successful and meaningful reform effort. Throughout, the authors call for significant cultural shifts in thinking about how the Reserve Components are used and integrated into a Total Force.
As with the post-Cold War downsizing during the Clinton administration in the late 1990s, one critical challenge for the U.S. Army centers on the qualitative, institutional character of the Army after the reductions -- will the U.S. Army manifest the essential characteristics and behavior of a military profession with Soldiers and civilians who see themselves sacrificially called to a vocation of service to country within a motivating professional culture that sustains a meritocratic ethic, or will the Army's character be more like any other government occupation in which its members view themselves as filing a job, motivated mostly by the extrinsic factors of pay, location, and work hours? In mid-2010, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff directed the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command, then General Martin Dempsey, to undertake a broad campaign of learning, involving the entire Department. The intent was to think through what it means for the Army to be a profession of arms and for its Soldiers and civilians to be professionals as the Army largely returns stateside after a decade of war and then quickly transitions to the new era of Defense reductions. Several new conceptions of the Army as a military profession have been produced, along with numerous initiatives that are currently being staffed to strengthen the professional character of the Army as it simultaneously recovers from a decade of war and transitions through reductions in force. They form the descriptive content of this monograph.
Each year, the Army After Next Seminar students are asked to orient their Strategy Research Papers on topics appropriate to the programs 30-years in the future focus. Thirty years ago, the United States Army was deeply involved in Vietnam and in the Cold War. Officers could reasonably expect to serve repetitive tours in Southeast Asia interspersed with tours along either the Korean Demilitarized Zone or the Inter-German Border. The tension between sometimes guerrilla, sometimes major warfare in the Pacific and the prospects of nuclear war in Europe made any prognostications of a future like that which we currently enjoy an exercise in silliness. Yet we are now asking officers to make such prognostications with the end in view that they might be less surprised by whatever does come into being.
Military cyberspace operations have evolved significantly over the past 2 decades and are now emerging into the realm of military operations in the traditional domains of land, sea, and air. The goal of this monograph is to provide senior policymakers, decisionmakers, military leaders, and their respective staffs with a better understanding of Army cyberspace operations within the context of overall U.S. military cyberspace operations. It examines the development of such operations in three major sections. First, it looks at the evolution of Department of Defense cyberspace operations over the past decade to include the founding of U.S. Cyber Command from its roots in various military units focused on defensive and offensive cyberspace operations. Second, it examines the evolution of the Army implementation of cyberspace operations toward the initial establishment of Army Cyber Command as well as recent efforts to establish Fort Gordon, Georgia as the center of gravity for Army cyberspace activities. Third, it explores the role of cyberspace operations in the escalation of international conflict, focusing on the sufficiency of the current cyberspace force structure to address an international environment of multiple actors interacting with varying degrees of tension. Related products: Global Trends: Paradox of Progress can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00329-1 Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-020-01627-6 Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00287-2 Prospects for the Rule of Law in Cyberspace can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01222-9 Deterring Cybertrespass and Securing Cyberspace: Lessons From United States Border Control Strategies is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01220-2 NATO Cyberspace Capability: A Strategic and Operational Evolution can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01191-5 Cyber Defense: An International View is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01194-0
Although different U.S. Presidential administrations often face differing national security challenges, one element common to all American Presidents is the desire for policy options when it comes to managing those challenges. Options provide room for maneuver strategically, operationally, and politically. In this monograph, the U.S. Army War College's Dr. John R. Deni argues that some persistent biases and some more recent trends in defense strategy, planning, and budgeting are likely to have the effect of reducing the options available to current and future senior U.S. leaders.
This paper, jointly sponsored by SSI and CPME, is intended to be the first of many whose purpose is to promote scholarship on Officership and the Professional Military Ethic as well as enhance the discussion of military professionalism within the Army and sister services.
Today, America faces security challenges that are exceedingly dynamic and complex, in part because of the ever changing mix and number of actors involved and the pace with which the strategic and operational environments change. To meet these new challenges more effectively, the Obama administration advocated strengthening civilian instruments of national power and enhancing America's whole-of-government (WOG) capabilities. Although the need for comprehensive integration and coordination of civilian and military, governmental and nongovernmental, national and international capabilities to improve efficiency and effectiveness of post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding efforts is widely recognized, Washington has been criticized for its attempts at creating WOG responses to international crises and conflicts for overcommitment of resources, lack of sufficient funding and personnel, competition between agencies, ambiguous mission objectives, and undermining the military's primary purpose of defending the national interest. Presenting the results of an international Symposium held at Kennesaw State University in February 2011, this volume traces the genesis of WOG, critically examines current WOG practices, and draws lessons from the operational contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan. The first part of the book describes the overall global security context within which peacebuilding and stability operations are currently conducted, examines the merits of WOG approaches, and discusses their efficacy for responding to a range of emerging threats. The second part addresses some of the practical challenges of implementing WOG approaches to international conflict management and specifically to U.S. intervention in fragile states. The third and final part examines WOG efforts in the field and draws lessons learned from operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq to potential future interventions"--Publisher's website.
This monograph explores the utility of forward presence in Europe, placing the recent decisions -- and, in particular, the arguments against forward presence -- in the context of a decades-long tradition on the part of many political leaders, scholars, and others to mistakenly tie the forward-basing of U.S. forces to more equal defense burden sharing across the entire North Atlantic alliance. In assessing whether and how forward presence still matters in terms of protecting U.S. interests and achieving U.S. objectives, the author bridges the gap between academics and practitioners by grounding his analysis in political science theory while illuminating how forward-basing yields direct, tangible benefits in terms of military operational interoperability. Moreover, this monograph forms a critical datapoint in the ongoing dialogue regarding the future of American landpower, particular in this age of austerity.
Developing a U.S. national security strategy for Latin America is a daunting task in an era of scarce resources. Yet, it is important at this historical juncture that the effort be undertaken. The demise of the Cold War has produced not an "End of History" but a "New World Disorder," which may well become more tumultuous in the decades ahead. Thus, it is crucial at this turn of the millennium to reconsider the prospects for regional security, the challenges that both new and old dangers may pose to U.S. interests, and the kind of strategy and policies that might enable the United States to both better cope with current problems and head off those that are just over the horizon. In this report, Dr. Donald E. Schulz first analyzes U.S. security interests in Latin America. He then surveys the primary challenges to those interests, and how well U.S. strategy and policy are equipped to cope with them. But he does not stop there. He suggests how the security environment is likely to change over the next quarter century, both in terms of the new dangers that may arise and the evolution of problems that already exist. His conclusion that we are not strategically equipped to face the future is a disturbing one, for Latin America's importance to the United States is growing fast even as our attention is flagging. Will we have the insight to recognize our own interests, the will to commit sufficient resources to attain them, and the intellectual wherewithal to relate our means to our ends?
The subject of U.S. grand strategy has been getting increasing attention from the policy and academic communities. But too often the debate suffers from being too reductionist, limiting America's choices to worldwide hegemony or narrow isolation. There is a wide spectrum of choices before Washington that lie "somewhere in the middle." Too often not enough thought is given to how such alternative strategies should be designed and implemented. The future cannot be known, and earlier predictions of American decline have proven to be premature. However, there is a shift in wealth and power to the extent that America may not be able to hold on to its position as an unrivalled unipolar superpower. Therefore, it is worth thinking about how the United States could shape and adjust to the changing landscape around it. What is more, there are a number of interlocking factors that mean such a shift would make sense: transnational problems needing collaborative efforts...
As the war in Afghanistan draws to a close, the Army increasingly is focused upon 'regionally aligning' its forces. To do so effectively, however, it must undertake several initiatives. First, the Army must acknowledge and liberate the unique productive capabilities (talents) of each individual. Second, it must shift from process-oriented, industrial age personnel management to productivity-focused, information age talent management. Third, the Army must foster enduring human relationships between its organizations and the governments, militaries, and populations to which they are regionally aligned. Hand in hand with this, it must redesign its Force Generation Model to create regional expertise at both individual and organizational levels. Finally, the Army must ensure that regional alignment does not degrade the worldwide 'flex' capabilities of its forces"--Publisher's web site.
What is strategic stability and why is it important? This edited collection offers the most current authoritative survey of this topic, which is central to U.S. strategy in the field of nuclear weapons and great power relations. A variety of authors and leading experts in the field of strategic issues and regional studies offer both theoretical and practical insights into the basic concepts associated with strategic stability, what implications these have for the United States, as well as key regions such as the Middle East, and perspectives on strategic stability in Russia and China. Readers will develop a deeper and more developed understanding of this concept from this engaging and informative work.
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