In The Political Economy of Public Sector Governance, Anthony Michael Bertelli introduces core ideas in positive political theory as they apply to public management and policy. Though recent literature that mathematically models relationships between politicians and public managers provides insight into contemporary public administration, the technical way these works present information limits their appeal. This book helps readers understand public-sector governance arrangements and the implications these arrangements have for public management practice and policy outcomes by presenting information in a non-technical way.
Those who implement policies have the discretion to shape democratic values. Public administration is not policy administered, but democracy administered.
Combining insights from traditional thought and practice and from contemporary political analysis, Madison's Managers presents a constitutional theory of public administration in the United States. Anthony Michael Bertelli and Laurence E. Lynn Jr. contend that managerial responsibility in American government depends on official respect for the separation of powers and a commitment to judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability in managerial practice. The authors argue that public management—administration by unelected officials of public agencies and activities based on authority delegated to them by policymakers—derives from the principles of American constitutionalism, articulated most clearly by James Madison. Public management is, they argue, a constitutional institution necessary to successful governance under the separation of powers. To support their argument, Bertelli and Lynn combine two intellectual traditions often regarded as antagonistic: modern political economy, which regards public administration as controlled through bargaining among the separate powers and organized interests, and traditional public administration, which emphasizes the responsible implementation of policies established by legislatures and elected executives while respecting the procedural and substantive rights enforced by the courts. These literatures are mutually reinforcing, the authors argue, because both feature the role of constitutional principles in public management. Madison's Managers challenges public management scholars and professionals to recognize that the legitimacy and future of public administration depend on its constitutional foundations and their specific implications for managerial practice.
We undertake the first quantitative and broadly comparative study of the structure and performance of partnership communities to our knowledge. Our study addresses several important research questions. How connected are the members of partnership communities? How can we understand the quality of the projects a community undertakes? How do political institutions shape their structure and performance? After defining partnership communities as networked communities of private firms which form the consortia that enter into long-term contractual arrangements with governments, we show how they are affected by government demand for partners. We then provide an overview of those factors predicting success in financing projects. Finally, we focus on the political economy of partnership communities. We develop and test theoretical predictions about how national institutions shape partnership communities and the quality of projects. We also investigate voters' preferences over alternative arrangements of infrastructure delivery before drawing out implications for research and practice.
Those who implement policies have the discretion to shape democratic values. Public administration is not policy administered, but democracy administered.
In The Political Economy of Public Sector Governance, Anthony Michael Bertelli introduces core ideas in positive political theory as they apply to public management and policy. Though recent literature that mathematically models relationships between politicians and public managers provides insight into contemporary public administration, the technical way these works present information limits their appeal. This book helps readers understand public-sector governance arrangements and the implications these arrangements have for public management practice and policy outcomes by presenting information in a nontechnical way.
We undertake the first quantitative and broadly comparative study of the structure and performance of partnership communities to our knowledge. Our study addresses several important research questions. How connected are the members of partnership communities? How can we understand the quality of the projects a community undertakes? How do political institutions shape their structure and performance? After defining partnership communities as networked communities of private firms which form the consortia that enter into long-term contractual arrangements with governments, we show how they are affected by government demand for partners. We then provide an overview of those factors predicting success in financing projects. Finally, we focus on the political economy of partnership communities. We develop and test theoretical predictions about how national institutions shape partnership communities and the quality of projects. We also investigate voters' preferences over alternative arrangements of infrastructure delivery before drawing out implications for research and practice.
This Element argues for a complementarity principle – governance values should complement political values – as a guide for designing the structures and procedures of public administration. It argues that the value-congruity inherent in the complementarity principle is indispensable to administrative responsibility. It identifies several core democratic values and critically assesses systems of collaborative governance, representative bureaucracy, and participatory policymaking in light of those values. It shows that the complementarity principle, applied to these different designs, facilitates administrative responsibility by making the structures themselves more consistent with democratic principles without compromising their aims. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
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