This paper constructs an intertemporal general equilibrium model designed to examine an economy in transition from central planning to being market oriented. A numerical algorithm is developed to obtain a solution for the model. Simulations using stylized country-specific data examine the effects of price controls during the transition period, as well as of imposing taxes on returns to investment, and on interest earned on private savings. The paper concludes that, under certain circumstances, the taxation of investment as well as of private savings may have positive effects upon consumer welfare, if price distortions are sufficiently severe.
Many books have been written on computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling. However, there are certain important areas for economic policy that have been largely overlooked. This intermediate/advanced text presents the topic as a methodology for the analysis of macro and fiscal policies in modern economies while introducing levels of disaggregation that are beyond the scope of standard macro models. The book begins by presenting the historical and intuitive background of general equilibrium analysis. Moving on, computer software is introduced to derive numerical solutions for economic models. The authors provide examples of code, bringing in data sources that have become the foundations of CGE applications. The methodology presented here, which differs from other CGE books, includes financial assets, government budget deficits, and debt financing of private investment. These topics are analyzed in the context of dynamic optimization, generating endogenous variables such as inflation, interest, and growth rates. The book also devotes significant attention to the applications of CGE models to developing economies. This textbook comes with a range of downloadable supplements and will be a valuable resource for students taking a CGE course as part of a program in advanced microeconomics, macroeconomics, development economics, or international trade economics.
This paper examines alternative ways to prevent losses from bank insolvencies. It is widely viewed that transparency in reporting bank balance sheets is a key element in reducing such losses. It is, however, unclear just how such transparency would be achieved. Current approaches to avoiding insolvencies generally involve international enforcement mechanisms. Among these are the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM), and, more generally, an international bankruptcy court. We develop a model that compares two alternative institutions for bank auditing. Neither of these institutions would require as much enforcement capability as an international bankruptcy court, hence they would be easier to introduce. The first of these is a system of central bank auditing of national banks. The second type of auditing is carried out by an international agency that collects risk information on banks in all countries and then provides it to depositors. Using a game-theoretic approach, we compare the informativeness of the disclosure rule in the symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in each of the two different auditing institutions. We show that the international auditor generally performs at least as well, and sometimes better than, auditing by either central banks, which, in turn, perform better than voluntary disclosure by the banks themselves. The results do not assume any informational advantages of the international auditor, nor is the international auditor somehow less "corrupt" than the central banks. Rather, the international auditor's credibility comes from the simple fact that its incentives are not distorted by a sovereignty bias that plagues the central banks.
This paper develops a dynamic computable general equilibrium model in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.
The definitive biography of the poet who was almost as notorious for his 'rock 'n' roll' lifestyle as his artistic work Dylan Thomas was a romantic and controversial figure; a poet who lived to excess and died young. An inventive genius with a gift for both lyrical phrases and impish humour, he also wrote for films and radio, and was renowned for his stage performances. He became the first literary star in the age of popular culture - a favourite of both T.S. Eliot and John Lennon. As his status as a poet and entertainer increased, so did his alcoholic binges and his sexual promiscuity, threatening to destroy his marriage to his fiery Irish wife Caitlin. As this extraordinary biography reveals, he was a man of many contradictions. But out of his tempestuous life, he produced some of the most dramatic and enduring poetry in the English language.
This paper constructs an intertemporal general equilibrium model designed to examine an economy in transition from central planning to being market oriented. A numerical algorithm is developed to obtain a solution for the model. Simulations using stylized country-specific data examine the effects of price controls during the transition period, as well as of imposing taxes on returns to investment, and on interest earned on private savings. The paper concludes that, under certain circumstances, the taxation of investment as well as of private savings may have positive effects upon consumer welfare, if price distortions are sufficiently severe.
This paper develops a dynamic computable general equilibrium model in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.
Many books have been written on computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling. However, there are certain important areas for economic policy that have been largely overlooked. This intermediate/advanced text presents the topic as a methodology for the analysis of macro and fiscal policies in modern economies while introducing levels of disaggregation that are beyond the scope of standard macro models. The book begins by presenting the historical and intuitive background of general equilibrium analysis. Moving on, computer software is introduced to derive numerical solutions for economic models. The authors provide examples of code, bringing in data sources that have become the foundations of CGE applications. The methodology presented here, which differs from other CGE books, includes financial assets, government budget deficits, and debt financing of private investment. These topics are analyzed in the context of dynamic optimization, generating endogenous variables such as inflation, interest, and growth rates. The book also devotes significant attention to the applications of CGE models to developing economies. This textbook comes with a range of downloadable supplements and will be a valuable resource for students taking a CGE course as part of a program in advanced microeconomics, macroeconomics, development economics, or international trade economics.
This paper examines alternative ways to prevent losses from bank insolvencies. It is widely viewed that transparency in reporting bank balance sheets is a key element in reducing such losses. It is, however, unclear just how such transparency would be achieved. Current approaches to avoiding insolvencies generally involve international enforcement mechanisms. Among these are the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM), and, more generally, an international bankruptcy court. We develop a model that compares two alternative institutions for bank auditing. Neither of these institutions would require as much enforcement capability as an international bankruptcy court, hence they would be easier to introduce. The first of these is a system of central bank auditing of national banks. The second type of auditing is carried out by an international agency that collects risk information on banks in all countries and then provides it to depositors. Using a game-theoretic approach, we compare the informativeness of the disclosure rule in the symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in each of the two different auditing institutions. We show that the international auditor generally performs at least as well, and sometimes better than, auditing by either central banks, which, in turn, perform better than voluntary disclosure by the banks themselves. The results do not assume any informational advantages of the international auditor, nor is the international auditor somehow less "corrupt" than the central banks. Rather, the international auditor's credibility comes from the simple fact that its incentives are not distorted by a sovereignty bias that plagues the central banks.
We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of an open economy and use it to examine issues of trade liberalization in Mexico. In particular, we consider the fiscal implications of quotas and tariffs and, accordingly, their removal. We show that, in the short run, there may be negative revenue effects from tariff liberalization, so that it may be necessary to raise domestic taxes to compensate for the tariff reduction. We also show that these results are highly sensitive to behavioral shifts in exports. Since such shifts are quite likely given the nature of the trade reform currently being undertaken, it is important that we qualify our results accordingly.
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