Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CRT) in 1991 so that the United States could assist the former Soviet Republics with the safe and secure transportation, storage and elimination of nuclear weapons. The CRT program seeks to reduce the threat these weapons pose to the United States and to reduce the proliferation risks from nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union. Congress has authorised and appropriated around USD300-USD400 million each year for CTR. have questioned whether all of the proposed and ongoing projects contribute to US national security. Some have questioned Russia's commitment, both political and financial to some of the projects. This book reviews many of the concerns that have been raised in Congress during debates over CTR. It also provides a summary of the funding for different CTR projects and presents an analysis of CTR and its structure and impact. Contents: Preface; Overview of the CTR Program; Evolving Rationale, Program Implementation, Focus of the CTR Programs, Value of U.S. Assistance under CTR, Scope of the CTR Programs, Russia's Financial Commitment to CTR Programs, Linkage between U.S. Assistance and Russian Policies. Subject Index.
Contents: (1) Intro.: National Security, Arms Control, and Non-proliferation (NP); The Arms Control Agenda; (2) Arms Control Between the U.S. and States of the Former Soviet Union: The Early Years: SALT I and SALT II; Reagan and Bush Years: INF and START; Clinton and Bush Years: Moving Past START and the ABM Treaty; Threat Reduction and NP Assist.; (3) Multilateral Nuclear NP Activities: The Internat. Nuclear NP Regime; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Fissile Material Prod¿n. Cutoff Treaty; Informal Coop.; (4) Non-Nuclear Multilateral Endeavors: European Conventional Arms Control; Conventional Technology Controls; Weapons Elimination Conventions. App: List of Treaties and Agree.; U.S. Treaty Ratification Process; Arms Control Org.
On May 24, 2002, Pres. Bush and Russia¿s Pres. Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. It mandated that the U.S. and Russia reduce their strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by Dec. 31, 2012. The two nations began, in 2006, to hold discussions about the 2009 expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which contains monitoring provisions. Contents of this report: (1) The Negot¿s.: Russian, and U.S. Objectives; Reaching an Agree.; Form and Content of the Agree.; (2) The Treaty; (3) Force Structures Under the Treaty; U.S., and Russia¿s Force Structure; (4) Assessing the Outcome: Russia¿s, and U.S. Objectives; (5) Treaty Ratification; (6) Response and Reaction; (8) The Road Ahead. Tables.
Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in Nov. 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million to over $1 billion/year across 3 agencies. It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and non-proliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking into the hands of rogue nations or terrorists. This report discusses issues related to U.S. non-proliferation and threat reduction assistance. Illus.
Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control; (3) The Components of a Verification Regime: The Objectives of a Verification Regime; Assessing Verifiability; Monitoring and Verification in U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian Arms Control; Monitoring and Verification in New START (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty); National Technical Means of Verification; Providing Telemetry Generated During Missile Flight Tests: Telemetry Exchange in START; Telemetry Exchange in New START; Mobile ICBMs: Limits on Mobile ICBMs in START; Mobile ICBMs in New START; On-Site Inspections: On-Site Inspections in START; On-Site Inspections in New START; (4) Assessing the Verification Regime in New START. Illustrations.
Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Distinction Between Strategic and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NNW); (3) U.S. and Soviet NNW: (a) U.S. NNW During the Cold War; (b) Soviet NNW During the Cold War; (c) 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives; (d) U.S. NNW after the Cold War; (e) Russian NNW after the Cold War; (f) Changing the Focus of the Debate; (4) Issues for Congress: (a) Issues: Safety and Security of Russian NNW; The Role of NNW in Russia¿s National Security Policy; The Role of NNW in U.S. National Security Policy; The Role of NNW in NATO Policy and Alliance Strategy; The Relationship Between NNW and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy; (b) Policy Options: Status Quo; Reduce Reliance on Nuclear Weapons; Cooperative Responses.
The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1991; it entered into force in December 1994 and is due to expire in December 2009. The United States and Russia have held several meetings to discuss options for continuing their arms control relationship. They are currently negotiating a new Treaty that would replace START. Contents of this report: Introduction; The START Treaty; The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty; and Preparing for START Expiration.
Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: Rationale for the PGS Mission; PGS and the U.S. Strategic Command; Potential Targets for the PGS Mission; Conventional BM and the PGS Mission; (3) Plans and Programs: Navy Programs: Reentry Vehicle Research; Conventional Trident Modification; Sub.-Launched Intermediate-Range BM; Air Force Programs: The FALCON Study; Reentry Vehicle Research and Warhead Options; Missile Options; Defense-Wide Conventional PGS: The Conventional Strike Missile; Hypersonic Test Vehicle; Army Advanced Hypersonic Weapon; ArcLight; (4) Issues for Congress: Assessing the Rationale for CPGS; Reviewing the Alternatives; Arms Control Issues. A print on demand report.
Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons; Need for a National Debate?; (3) Defining Deterrence: Deterrence, in Theory; Deterrence, During the Cold War; Deterrence, After the Cold War; Deterrence in the 21st Century; (4) Issues for Congress: How Much Has Nuclear Strategy Changed?; Does Tailored Deterrence Enhance the Credibility of Nuclear Deterrence or Increase the Risk of Nuclear Use?; Can Tailored Deterrence Provide Guidance in Determining the Size and Structure of the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal?; What Role for U.S. Nuclear Weapons?
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