Sustainable peace in Afghanistan can be achieved only through the establishment of an “end-state” that is acceptable to the Afghan people but does not undermine the legitimate security interests of other actors in the region and beyond. This necessitates addressing legitimate national, regional and international concerns emanating from the Afghanistan situation. The key to achieving this goal is an integrated strategy that combines military strategy with political and developmental strategies. In developing such strategies, Afghan society needs to be mobilized in pursuit of what its population aspires to instead of what a supply-driven assistance program imposes upon it. The success of such a strategy depends on resources, sound Afghan leadership, coordinated international partnership, and – most importantly – time. Given local and regional political and security dynamics, the transition process will be multi-dimensional, complex, and nonlinear. Given the complexities of the regional environment, there is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Sustainable peace should come through a political settlement; and yet, the conflict can be lost militarily. Without military gains in the field, no elements of a political strategy can succeed: the insurgents will have little incentive to enter meaningful peace talks; the government will be unable to hold contested areas to establish effective local government and win over the population; regional actors will continue to hedge their bets. Furthermore, lack of military progress will give way to doubts in troop-providing nations about the sagacity of the mission. A successful transition is contingent on progress in reconciliation with, and reintegration of insurgents. Security arrangements for the process need to accompany peace talks. In this context, the military strategy should play a supporting role creating the space for effective prosecution of the political strategy. The gradual drawdown of US forces should be balanced with shifting the security responsibility to Afghan security forces as they progressively become more capable of doing the job. The pace of the drawdown must be “condition-based.” A fast-paced drawdown creates a security vacuum and reduces the chances of drawing the insurgents toward a negotiated political settlement. Finally, there is a need to emphasize the development of good governance and the rule of law, and to address the key grievances that fuel insurgency. In concrete terms, government reform requires a series of short-term and long-term corrective measures, including: improvement in the center–peripheries relationship; establishing checks and balances on executive power; improving government service-delivery capacity; enforcing the rule of law; and fighting corruption.
The history of Afghanistan is largely military history. From the Persians and Greeks of antiquity to the British, Soviet, and American powers in modern times, outsiders have led military conquests into the mountains and plains of Afghanistan, leaving their indelible marks on this ancient land at the juncture of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In this book Ali Ahmad Jalali, a former interior minister of Afghanistan, taps a deep understanding of his country's distant and recent past to explore Afghanistan's military history during the last two hundred years. With an introductory chapter highlighting the major military developments from early times to the foundation of the modern Afghan state, Jalali's account focuses primarily on the era of British conquest and Anglo-Afghan wars; the Soviet invasion; the civil war and the rise of the Taliban; and the subsequent U.S. invasion. Looking beyond persistent stereotypes and generalizations—e.g., the "graveyard of empires" designation emerging from the Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th century and the Soviet experience of the 1980s—Jalali offers a nuanced and comprehensive portrayal of the way of war pursued by both state and non-state actors in Afghanistan against different domestic and foreign enemies, under changing social, political, and technological conditions. He reveals how the structure of states, tribes, and social communities in Afghanistan, along with the scope of their controlled space, has shaped their modes of fighting throughout history. In particular, his account shows how dynastic wars and foreign conquests differ in principle, strategy, and method from wars initiated by non-state actors including tribal and community militias against foreign invasions or repressive government. Written by a professional soldier, politician, and noted scholar with a keen analytical grasp of his country's military and political history, this magisterial work offers unique insight into the military history of Afghanistan—and thus, into Afghanistan itself.
Afghanistan: A Military History from the Ancient Empires to the Great Game covers the military history of a region encompassing Afghanistan, Central and South Asia, and West Asia, over some 2,500 years. This is the first comprehensive study in any language published on the millennia-long competition for domination and influence in one of the key regions of the Eurasian continent. Jalali’s work covers some of the most important events and figures in world military history, including the armies commanded by Cyrus the Great, Alexander the Great, the Muslim conquerors, Chinggis Khan, Tamerlane, and Babur. Afghanistan was the site of their campaigns and the numerous military conquests that facilitated exchange of military culture and technology that influenced military developments far beyond the region. An enduring theme throughout Afghanistan is the strong influence of the geography and the often extreme nature of the local terrain. Invaders mostly failed because the locals outmaneuvered them in an unforgiving environment. Important segments include Alexander the Great, remembered to this day as a great victor, though not a grand builder; the rise of Islam in the early seventh century in the Arabian Peninsula and the monumental and enduring shift in the social and political map of the world brought by its conquering armies; the medieval Islamic era, when the constant rise and fall of ruling dynasties and the prevalence of an unstable security environment reinforced localism in political, social, and military life; the centuries-long impact of the destruction caused by Chinggis Khan’s thirteenth century; early eighteenth century, when the Afghans achieved a remarkable military victory with extremely limited means leading to the downfall of the Persian Safavid dynasty; and the Battle of Panipat (1761), where Afghan Emperor Ahmad Shah Abdali decisively routed the Hindu confederacy under Maratha leadership, widely considered as one of the decisive battles of the world. It was in this period when the Afghans founded their modern state and a vast empire under Ahmad Shah Durrani, which shaped the environment for the arrival of the European powers and the Great Game.
Provides reports from Mujahideen veterans and maps depicting locations and troop movements to explore how the Afghans fought a successful guerrilla war against their better-equipped and numerically superior Soviet enemies.
The history of Afghanistan is largely military history. From the Persians and Greeks of antiquity to the British, Soviet, and American powers in modern times, outsiders have led military conquests into the mountains and plains of Afghanistan, leaving their indelible marks on this ancient land at the juncture of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In this book Ali Ahmad Jalali, a former interior minister of Afghanistan, taps a deep understanding of his country's distant and recent past to explore Afghanistan's military history during the last two hundred years. With an introductory chapter highlighting the major military developments from early times to the foundation of the modern Afghan state, Jalali's account focuses primarily on the era of British conquest and Anglo-Afghan wars; the Soviet invasion; the civil war and the rise of the Taliban; and the subsequent U.S. invasion. Looking beyond persistent stereotypes and generalizations—e.g., the "graveyard of empires" designation emerging from the Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th century and the Soviet experience of the 1980s—Jalali offers a nuanced and comprehensive portrayal of the way of war pursued by both state and non-state actors in Afghanistan against different domestic and foreign enemies, under changing social, political, and technological conditions. He reveals how the structure of states, tribes, and social communities in Afghanistan, along with the scope of their controlled space, has shaped their modes of fighting throughout history. In particular, his account shows how dynastic wars and foreign conquests differ in principle, strategy, and method from wars initiated by non-state actors including tribal and community militias against foreign invasions or repressive government. Written by a professional soldier, politician, and noted scholar with a keen analytical grasp of his country's military and political history, this magisterial work offers unique insight into the military history of Afghanistan—and thus, into Afghanistan itself.
DIVWhen the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, few experts believed the fledgling Mujahideen resistance movement had a chance of withstanding the modern, mechanized onslaught of the Soviet Army. But somehow, the Mujahideen prevailed against a larger and decisively better equipped foe. No one predicted the Soviet Union would withdraw in defeat in 1989. With more than 100 first-hand reports from Mujahideen combat veterans and maps illustrating locations and disposition of forces, this book is a tactical look at a decentralized army of foot-mobile guerrillas as they wage war against a superior force. Learn about Mujahideen ambushes, raids, shelling attacks, fights against heliborne insertions, attacks on Soviet strong points, and urban combat in this rare look at the Soviet-Afghan conflict./div
Afghanistan: A Military History from the Ancient Empires to the Great Game covers the military history of a region encompassing Afghanistan, Central and South Asia, and West Asia, over some 2,500 years. This is the first comprehensive study in any language published on the millennia-long competition for domination and influence in one of the key regions of the Eurasian continent. Jalali’s work covers some of the most important events and figures in world military history, including the armies commanded by Cyrus the Great, Alexander the Great, the Muslim conquerors, Chinggis Khan, Tamerlane, and Babur. Afghanistan was the site of their campaigns and the numerous military conquests that facilitated exchange of military culture and technology that influenced military developments far beyond the region. An enduring theme throughout Afghanistan is the strong influence of the geography and the often extreme nature of the local terrain. Invaders mostly failed because the locals outmaneuvered them in an unforgiving environment. Important segments include Alexander the Great, remembered to this day as a great victor, though not a grand builder; the rise of Islam in the early seventh century in the Arabian Peninsula and the monumental and enduring shift in the social and political map of the world brought by its conquering armies; the medieval Islamic era, when the constant rise and fall of ruling dynasties and the prevalence of an unstable security environment reinforced localism in political, social, and military life; the centuries-long impact of the destruction caused by Chinggis Khan’s thirteenth century; early eighteenth century, when the Afghans achieved a remarkable military victory with extremely limited means leading to the downfall of the Persian Safavid dynasty; and the Battle of Panipat (1761), where Afghan Emperor Ahmad Shah Abdali decisively routed the Hindu confederacy under Maratha leadership, widely considered as one of the decisive battles of the world. It was in this period when the Afghans founded their modern state and a vast empire under Ahmad Shah Durrani, which shaped the environment for the arrival of the European powers and the Great Game.
Sustainable peace in Afghanistan can be achieved only through the establishment of an “end-state” that is acceptable to the Afghan people but does not undermine the legitimate security interests of other actors in the region and beyond. This necessitates addressing legitimate national, regional and international concerns emanating from the Afghanistan situation. The key to achieving this goal is an integrated strategy that combines military strategy with political and developmental strategies. In developing such strategies, Afghan society needs to be mobilized in pursuit of what its population aspires to instead of what a supply-driven assistance program imposes upon it. The success of such a strategy depends on resources, sound Afghan leadership, coordinated international partnership, and – most importantly – time. Given local and regional political and security dynamics, the transition process will be multi-dimensional, complex, and nonlinear. Given the complexities of the regional environment, there is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Sustainable peace should come through a political settlement; and yet, the conflict can be lost militarily. Without military gains in the field, no elements of a political strategy can succeed: the insurgents will have little incentive to enter meaningful peace talks; the government will be unable to hold contested areas to establish effective local government and win over the population; regional actors will continue to hedge their bets. Furthermore, lack of military progress will give way to doubts in troop-providing nations about the sagacity of the mission. A successful transition is contingent on progress in reconciliation with, and reintegration of insurgents. Security arrangements for the process need to accompany peace talks. In this context, the military strategy should play a supporting role creating the space for effective prosecution of the political strategy. The gradual drawdown of US forces should be balanced with shifting the security responsibility to Afghan security forces as they progressively become more capable of doing the job. The pace of the drawdown must be “condition-based.” A fast-paced drawdown creates a security vacuum and reduces the chances of drawing the insurgents toward a negotiated political settlement. Finally, there is a need to emphasize the development of good governance and the rule of law, and to address the key grievances that fuel insurgency. In concrete terms, government reform requires a series of short-term and long-term corrective measures, including: improvement in the center–peripheries relationship; establishing checks and balances on executive power; improving government service-delivery capacity; enforcing the rule of law; and fighting corruption.
Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research
Published Date
ISBN 10
9948144805
ISBN 13
9789948144809
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