Some combinations of attitudes-beliefs, credences, intentions, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on-do not fit together right: they are incoherent. A natural idea is that there are requirements of 'structural rationality' that forbid us from being in these incoherent states. Yet many philosophers have recently attempted to minimize or eliminate structural rationality, arguing that it is just a 'shadow' of 'substantive rationality' - that is, correctly responding to one's reasons. In 'Fitting Things Together', Alex Worsnip pushes back against this trend, providing a sustained defense of the view that structural rationality is a genuine, autonomous, unified, and normatively significant phenomenon.
Some combinations of attitudes-beliefs, credences, intentions, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on-do not fit together right: they are incoherent. A natural idea is that there are requirements of 'structural rationality' that forbid us from being in these incoherent states. Yet many philosophers have recently attempted to minimize or eliminate structural rationality, arguing that it is just a 'shadow' of 'substantive rationality' - that is, correctly responding to one's reasons. In 'Fitting Things Together', Alex Worsnip pushes back against this trend, providing a sustained defense of the view that structural rationality is a genuine, autonomous, unified, and normatively significant phenomenon.
A popular model of human action treats it as universally explicable by appeal to what we want. A related view evaluates our actions as rational or otherwise by appeal to what we want. However, these dominant views sit in tension with two other common sense ideas. First, that our normative beliefs — such as our beliefs about what we ought to do — sometimes explain our actions. Second, that those beliefs are crucial for determining whether our actions are rational. To try and resolve these tensions, this book defends 'desire-as-belief', the view that desires are just a special subset of our normative beliefs. This view entitles us to accept orthodox models of human motivation and rationality that explain those things with reference to desire, while also making room for our normative beliefs to play a role in those domains. This view also tells us to diverge from the orthodox view on which desires themselves can never be right or wrong. Rather, according to desire-as-belief, our desires can themselves be assessed for their accuracy, and they are wrong when they misrepresent normative features of the world. Hume says that it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of your finger, but he is wrong: it is foolish to have this preference, and this is so because this preference misrepresents the relative worth of these things. This book mounts an engaging and comprehensive defence of these ideas.
Philosophy has a strong presence in evidence law and the nature of evidence is a highly debated topic in both general and social epistemology; legal theorists working in the evidence law area draw on different underlying philosophical theories of knowledge, inference and probability. Core evidentiary concepts and principles, such as the presumption of innocence, standards of proof, and others, reply on moral and political philosophy for their understanding and interpretation. Written by leading scholars across the globe, this volume brings together philosophical debates on the nature and function of evidence, proof, and law of evidence. It presents a cross-disciplinary overview of central issues in the theory and methodology of legal evidence and covers a wide range of contemporary debates on topics such as truth, proof, economics, gender, and race. The volume covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation. Divided in to five parts, Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation.
At a time when teaching and learning policy too often presents itself in a simplistic input-output language of measurable targets and objectives, The Affected Teacher explores the role played by emotionality in how professional life is experienced by school teachers. The book argues that, in the very highly organised and structured social spaces of public institutions, emotionality - or, more precisely, all that is included in the concept of ‘affect’ - needs to be recognised and validated, rather than ignored or pathologised. It explores how neoliberal education policy seeks to mould professional subjectivities, relationships and practices; how teachers experience and ‘manage’ their feelings; and the role that affect plays in guiding either compliance with or resistance to often unpopular policy directives. Drawing on a rich body of original data comprising formal and informal discussions with a range of teachers, the case is argued for psychoanalytically and politically informed individual and group reflexivity, both as a form of professional and personal development and as a way of keeping alive alternative beliefs and understandings regarding the purposes of education. The Affected Teacher is relevant to practising schoolteachers and to undergraduate and graduate students and academics involved in education related courses such as policy studies, education management and the sociology of education, as well as disciplines related to psychosocial studies and psychoanalysis.
In 2006, the Wall Street pioneer and philanthropist Ray Chambers flicked through some holiday snapshots taken by his friend, development economist Jeff Sachs, and remarked on the placid beauty of a group of sleeping Malawian children. "They're not sleeping," Sachs told him. "They're in malarial comas. A few days later, they were all dead." Chambers had long avoided the public eye, but this moment sparked his determination to coordinate an unprecedented, worldwide effort to eradicate a disease that has haunted humanity since before the advent of medicine. Award-winning journalist Alex Perry obtained unique access to Chambers, now the UN Special Envoy for Malaria. In this book, Perry weaves together science and history with on-the-ground reporting and a riveting expos' of the workings of humanitarian aid to document Chambers' campaign. By replacing traditional ideas of assistance with business acumen and hustle, Chambers saved millions of lives, and upturned current notions of aid, forging a new path not just for the developing world but for global business and philanthropy.
A graphic memoir for teens about the author's efforts to overcome her social anxiety by learning improv comedy. Alex has crippling social anxiety. All day long, she is trapped in a web of negative thoughts and paralyzing fear. To pull herself free of this endless cycle, Alex does something truly terrifying: she signs up for an improv comedy class. By forcing herself to play silly games and act out ridiculous scenes, Alex confronts the unbearable weight of embarrassment, makes new friends, rediscovers parts of herself that she'd hidden away, and ultimately faces her greatest fear by performing onstage for all to see.
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