The three main financial inflows to developing countries have largely increased during the last two decades, despite the large debate in the literature regarding their effects on economic growth which is not yet clear-cut. An emerging literature investigates the dependence of their effects on some country characteristics such as human and physical capital constraint, macroeconomic policy and institutional capacity. This paper extends the literature by arguing that climate shocks may undermine the effect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), official development assistance (ODA) and migrants’ remittances on economic expansion. Based on neoclassical growth framework, the theoretical model indicates that FDI, ODA, and remittances improve economic growth, and the size of the effect increases with good absorptive capacity. However, climate shocks reduce this positive effect of financial flows in developing countries. Using a sample of low and middle-income countries from 1995 to 2018, the empirical investigation confirms the theoretical conclusions. Developing countries should build strong resilience to climate change. Actions are also needed at global level to reduce greenhouse gases emissions, and build strong structural resilience to climate shocks especially in developing countries.
This paper investigates the impact of fuel price increases on social unrests in addition to the macroeconomic, social and institutional factors driving this relationship. Using the IV fixed-effect estimator on a sample of 101 developing countries during 2001-2020, we find that changes in fuel prices are positively associated with the number of social unrests, mainly anti-government demonstrations. This impact is however amplified: (i) during economic downturns and periods of high exchange rate instability; (ii) when government spending is low, especially on health and education, thus suggesting that streamlining fuel subsides and diverting parts of the reform savings to the health and education sectors is an appropriate policy that could appease social tensions; (iii) in countries with high income inequality, low institutional quality and high level of corruption. The results are robust to a battery of tests, including the use of an instrumental variable approach to address reverse causality concerns given that social unrests could also prompt a freeze in fuel prices. We also find consistent results using either changes in diesel or gasoline prices. Overall, the findings of the paper provide support to the grievance and deprivation theory in explaining the association between fuel price increases and social unrests, but fail to find evidence for the resource theory and the theory of political opportunities.
Achieving the Istanbul Programme of Action by 2020 focuses on four specific themes: structural transformation and export diversification in the LDCs; prospects of graduation of countries from the LDC group; implications of the 2030 Agenda in view of LDC concerns; and new challenges facing LDCs in their pursuit for achieving SDGs.
The three main financial inflows to developing countries have largely increased during the last two decades, despite the large debate in the literature regarding their effects on economic growth which is not yet clear-cut. An emerging literature investigates the dependence of their effects on some country characteristics such as human and physical capital constraint, macroeconomic policy and institutional capacity. This paper extends the literature by arguing that climate shocks may undermine the effect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), official development assistance (ODA) and migrants’ remittances on economic expansion. Based on neoclassical growth framework, the theoretical model indicates that FDI, ODA, and remittances improve economic growth, and the size of the effect increases with good absorptive capacity. However, climate shocks reduce this positive effect of financial flows in developing countries. Using a sample of low and middle-income countries from 1995 to 2018, the empirical investigation confirms the theoretical conclusions. Developing countries should build strong resilience to climate change. Actions are also needed at global level to reduce greenhouse gases emissions, and build strong structural resilience to climate shocks especially in developing countries.
This paper investigates the impact of fuel price increases on social unrests in addition to the macroeconomic, social and institutional factors driving this relationship. Using the IV fixed-effect estimator on a sample of 101 developing countries during 2001-2020, we find that changes in fuel prices are positively associated with the number of social unrests, mainly anti-government demonstrations. This impact is however amplified: (i) during economic downturns and periods of high exchange rate instability; (ii) when government spending is low, especially on health and education, thus suggesting that streamlining fuel subsides and diverting parts of the reform savings to the health and education sectors is an appropriate policy that could appease social tensions; (iii) in countries with high income inequality, low institutional quality and high level of corruption. The results are robust to a battery of tests, including the use of an instrumental variable approach to address reverse causality concerns given that social unrests could also prompt a freeze in fuel prices. We also find consistent results using either changes in diesel or gasoline prices. Overall, the findings of the paper provide support to the grievance and deprivation theory in explaining the association between fuel price increases and social unrests, but fail to find evidence for the resource theory and the theory of political opportunities.
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.