Central banks are increasingly pondering whether to issue their own digital currencies to the general public, so-called retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). The majority of IMF member countries are actively evaluating CBDCs, with only a few having issued CBDCs or undertaken extensive pilots or tests. This paper shines the spotlight on the handful of countries at the frontier in the hope of identifying and sharing insights, lessons, and open questions for the benefit of the many countries following in their footsteps. Clearly, what can be gleaned from these experiences does not necessarily apply elsewhere. The sample of countries remains small and country circumstances differ widely. However, the insights in this paper may inspire further investigation and allow countries to gain time by building on the experience of others. Importantly, the purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the courses taken by different jurisdictions, but to study and discuss their key experiences and lessons. The paper studies six advanced CBDC projects, drawing on collaboration and exchanges with the respective central banks to get insights beyond what has previously been published. Unless a specific published source is cited, all information stems from interviews and workshops with members of CBDC project teams in each jurisdiction.
Digitalization of the economy provides both challenges and opportunities. Central banks should ensure that they have the capacity to continue to meet their policy objectives in the digital age. It is in this context that central bank digital currency (CBDC) should be evaluated. If designed appropriately, CBDCs could allow central banks to modernize payment systems and future-proof central bank money as the pace and shape of digitalization continues to evolve. However, the decision to proceed with CBDC exploration and an eventual launch would need to be jurisdiction specific, depending on the degree of digitalization of the economy, the legal and regulatory frameworks, and the central bank’s internal capacity. This paper proposes a dynamic decision-making framework under which the central bank can make decisions under uncertainty. A phased and iterative approach could allow central banks to adjust the pace, scale, and scope of their CBDC projects as the domestic and international environment changes.
Japan was sometimes described as a country of "peace" during the Cold War period, in contrast to the continental border conflicts taking place at the time, such as the China-Soviet rivalry. However, as the maritime frontier was "rediscovered" and defined by the regional powers and legal refinements of the 1970s, the process of states seeking a secure maritime zone has accelerated and maritime rivalries have become as intense as inland rivalries. This book examines the territorial disputes souring relations between Japan and its three neighbours: Russia, South Korea and China. It combines an empirical study with theoretical advancements in comparative research to understand the Cold War and post-Cold War border issues related to Japan, particularly the Northern Territories/South Kurils dispute with Russia; Takeshima/Dokto with Korea; and Senkaku/Diaoyu with China and Taiwan. Based on the history of negotiations with the Soviet Union and Russia over the course of fifty years, the study offers a series of practical suggestions to enable these disputes to be separated from arguments over their history and resolved on the basis of the principle of mutual advantage for those affected by them. This book provides not only the key to resolving these three disputes affecting East Asia, but the framework in which to seek the resolution of other territorial issues worldwide. Explaining the history and possible outcomes of Japan’s territorial disputes with Russia, South Korea and China whilst providing concrete steps for resolving entrenched territorial disputes, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of International Relations, Japanese Politics and International Law.
This paper analyzes the legal foundations of central bank digital currency (CBDC) under central bank and monetary law. Absent strong legal foundations, the issuance of CBDC poses legal, financial and reputational risks for central banks. While the appropriate design of the legal framework will up to a degree depend on the design features of the CBDC, some general conclusions can be made. First, most central bank laws do not currently authorize the issuance of CBDC to the general public. Second, from a monetary law perspective, it is not evident that “currency” status can be attributed to CBDC. While the central bank law issue can be solved through rather straithforward law reform, the monetary law issue poses fundmental legal policy challenges.
Central banks are increasingly pondering whether to issue their own digital currencies to the general public, so-called retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). The majority of IMF member countries are actively evaluating CBDCs, with only a few having issued CBDCs or undertaken extensive pilots or tests. This paper shines the spotlight on the handful of countries at the frontier in the hope of identifying and sharing insights, lessons, and open questions for the benefit of the many countries following in their footsteps. Clearly, what can be gleaned from these experiences does not necessarily apply elsewhere. The sample of countries remains small and country circumstances differ widely. However, the insights in this paper may inspire further investigation and allow countries to gain time by building on the experience of others. Importantly, the purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the courses taken by different jurisdictions, but to study and discuss their key experiences and lessons. The paper studies six advanced CBDC projects, drawing on collaboration and exchanges with the respective central banks to get insights beyond what has previously been published. Unless a specific published source is cited, all information stems from interviews and workshops with members of CBDC project teams in each jurisdiction.
Digitalization of the economy provides both challenges and opportunities. Central banks should ensure that they have the capacity to continue to meet their policy objectives in the digital age. It is in this context that central bank digital currency (CBDC) should be evaluated. If designed appropriately, CBDCs could allow central banks to modernize payment systems and future-proof central bank money as the pace and shape of digitalization continues to evolve. However, the decision to proceed with CBDC exploration and an eventual launch would need to be jurisdiction specific, depending on the degree of digitalization of the economy, the legal and regulatory frameworks, and the central bank’s internal capacity. This paper proposes a dynamic decision-making framework under which the central bank can make decisions under uncertainty. A phased and iterative approach could allow central banks to adjust the pace, scale, and scope of their CBDC projects as the domestic and international environment changes.
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