As a window into understanding the relationship between globalization and the pursuit of national security, Adam N. Stulberg examines Russia's mixed success at leveraging energy advantages in Eurasia from 1992 to 2002. Stulberg supplements traditional analyses of statecraft by highlighting indirect market and regulatory mechanisms for altering the behavior of foreign and subnational actors, as well as by demonstrating the usability of "soft power" and global networks. The power of this new theory of "strategic manipulation" is illustrated in several case studies, including Russia's successful natural gas diplomacy toward Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Russia's troubled oil diplomacy toward Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and Russia's mixed success with commercial nuclear diplomacy toward Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
As a window into understanding the relationship between globalization and the pursuit of national security, Adam N. Stulberg examines Russia's mixed success at leveraging energy advantages in Eurasia from 1992 to 2002. Stulberg supplements traditional analyses of statecraft by highlighting indirect market and regulatory mechanisms for altering the behavior of foreign and subnational actors, as well as by demonstrating the usability of "soft power" and global networks. The power of this new theory of "strategic manipulation" is illustrated in several case studies, including Russia's successful natural gas diplomacy toward Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Russia's troubled oil diplomacy toward Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and Russia's mixed success with commercial nuclear diplomacy toward Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
Why are some military organizations more adept than others at reinventing themselves? Why do some efforts succeed rapidly while others only gather momentum over time or become sidetracked or even subverted? This book explicates the conditions under which military organizations have both succeeded and failed at institutionalizing new ideas and forms of warfare. Through comparative analysis of some classic cases - US naval aviation during the interwar period; German and British armour development during the same period; and the US Army's experience with counter-insurgency during the Vietnam War - the authors offer a novel explanation for change rooted in managerial strategies for aligning service incentives and norms. With contemporary policy makers scrambling to digest the lessons of recent wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to meet the unfolding challenges of the new revolution in military affairs (RMA), understanding the sources and impediments to transformation has become critical.
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